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Abstract 
Economic stagnation and demographic change in Russia are putting intense 
pressure on the government budget. Tax revenues have been declining since 
the late 2000s. Meanwhile, the oil dependency of Russia’s budget has in-
creased significantly. This became patently clear when the oil price plum-
meted in 2014. Energy revenues have since begun to recover, but the 
Finance Ministry’s reserves have shrunk considerably and are only slowly 
being replenished. 
To keep public budgets stable, the Russian government is forced to raise 
taxes and extend the retirement age in the years to come. There is a widen-
ing gap in funds required to cover the paternalistic social policies of earlier 
years. At the same time, the struggle for control of public resources is having 
a destabilizing effect on the political regime – especially in light of the ever 
more pressing question of Putin’s successor in the Kremlin. 
Up to the presidential election of 2018, the Russian leadership avoided 
making any budget cuts that would have hurt key clientele groups: retirees 
and the military-industrial complex. Additional income was generated in-
stead through a series of smaller budgetary adjustments. Shortly after the 
start of Putin’s fourth term, however, tax raises and a higher retirement age 
were announced, which lead to drastic declines in the president’s approval 
ratings. 
As a reaction to shrinking funds, budget policy is now being controlled 
in a more centralized way by Moscow, while public oversight of government 
budgets has been restricted. Shadow budgets have also emerged outside the 
purview of the finance administration. In this complex and politically tense 
situation, conflicts between elites are erupting with increasing frequency, 
bearing risks for Putin’s fourth term in office. 
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Issues and Conclusions 
Mounting Pressure on Russia’s 
Government Budget: Financial and 
Political Risks of Stagnation 
Russian budget revenues relative to GDP have de-
clined substantially over the last decade. The lower 
oil price is one reason for this, but tax revenues out-
side the energy sector have fallen as well. The Russian 
economy has been in a period of stagnation for a 
number of years now, placing a burden on state cof-
fers. The government reserves that the Kremlin was 
still able to fall back on prior to the 2009 financial 
crisis have been largely exhausted in 2015 and 2016, 
and economic growth is expected to be slow after 
2018. The Russian leadership faces ongoing financial 
difficulties in the years ahead, making unpopular 
policies such as increasing the value added tax and 
raising the retirement age necessary. 
At the same time, the domestic political situation 
has become more difficult for the Kremlin to manage. 
Without economic growth, the Russian leadership 
will no longer be able to fulfill its implicit “social con-
tract” with the population. As long as the standard of 
living was rising, the vast majority of Russian citizens 
refrained from active participation in politics. But then 
from 2014 to 2017, real incomes fell for four years 
running. The Kremlin could now be facing a crisis 
of legitimacy – and that in a phase of uncertainty 
about a possible shift of power after Putin’s last term 
of office (2018–2024). 
Will the Russian regime be able to adapt to the 
changing economic reality, or will dwindling re-
sources lead to a destabilization of the political sys-
tem? How is the Kremlin dealing with the increasing 
pressure to implement economic reforms? Are any 
practical ways to escape the budgetary dependence 
on oil revenues beginning to emerge, or will the risks 
increase further in the years to come? 
After the oil price collapse of 2014 put the state 
budget under pressure, the Kremlin pursued policies 
aimed at maintaining the existing political and eco-
nomic order. Rather than undertaking important but 
risky reform projects in the run-up to the 2018 presi-
dential election, the leadership in Moscow sought 
to mobilize remaining reserves in the system by im-
plementing a series of smaller budget and tax adjust-
ments. In doing so, it sought to keep the financial 
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and political risks resulting from budgetary policy 
in check. This changed with Putin’s inauguration, 
shortly after which tax increases and a higher retire-
ment age were announced, which have led to drastic 
declines in the president’s approval ratings. 
To increase revenues at the height of the economic 
crisis in 2016, the Russian government sold shares in 
the oil companies Bashneft and Rosneft but without 
relinquishing control over them. The state pension 
system discontinued capital accumulation so that all 
premiums could be used to cover the pay-as-you-go 
pensions. Russia’s commitment to oil output cuts, 
in line with the November 2016 resolution of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), was also aimed at increasing revenues with-
out engaging in structural reform within the country. 
On the spending side, Russia’s leadership has 
distinguished between politically risky and less risky 
areas. It has passed early and significant budget cuts 
in policy areas that did not affect the Kremlin’s core 
voters and supporters – areas like education, the 
economy (infrastructure), and health spending on 
the federal level. Pensions, social security, and 
defense, on the other hand, have long been spared 
from budget cuts. 
Only when the 2016 budget crisis reached danger-
ous proportions did the Russian government decide to 
reduce pension inflation adjustments and eventually 
also raise the retirement age. The Kremlin’s approach 
to military spending was similarly cautious: Decisions 
on a long-term state armament program were delayed 
repeatedly and finally made in fall of 2017, only after 
the oil price had recovered to some extent.  
The increased pressure on the government budget 
has exacerbated conflicts over the distribution of fi-
nancial resources, heightening the importance of con-
trol over the remaining funds. This has led, among 
other things, to a centralization and personalization 
of decision-making power over budgetary funds in 
the Kremlin. Other political actors like the State 
Duma have not played a significant role in the budget 
process for years now. The already low scope of action 
available to regional government administrations has 
been curtailed further in recent times. 
The Russian leadership is not only further weaken-
ing the Russian federalist system through centraliza-
tion, but also undermining the binding nature of 
budgetary planning itself. Budget plans have become 
more opaque and unspecific, and resources that lie 
outside the Finance Ministry’s purview have increased. 
The big state-owned enterprises play an important 
role in this: they only pay part of their profits into 
the state’s budget, and in return, they take on direct 
political responsibilities in Russia and abroad. Public 
control over government resources is thus being 
gradually eroded and the directors of the state-owned 
enterprises are becoming influential political figures 
with their own agendas. 
From the perspective of Germany and the EU, 
the vulnerability of Russia’s government budgets has 
important political implications. In a situation of 
declining government revenues, the Russian regime 
will have a difficult time legitimizing its rule by 
pointing to economic successes or instituting com-
prehensive social programs. The regime’s annexation 
of Crimea in 2014 garnered high approval ratings in 
2015 and 2016 despite the economic slump. If a loss 
of legitimacy becomes an imminent threat, the Rus-
sian leadership could be tempted to build on this 
experience. The result would be a stronger emphasis 
on mobilizing patriotic sentiment and intensifying 
anti-Western propaganda. An improvement in rela-
tions between the EU and Russia would then be 
pushed off into the more distant future. 
A more prolonged budget crisis or a serious de-
stabilization of the Russian regime could also have 
severe immediate impacts on the EU. For Germany, 
it would pose risks to the energy supply and to the 
security of foreign direct investments in Russia. Politi-
cal destabilization in Moscow would also quickly 
spread to neighboring countries with close economic 
ties to Russia. Unresolved conflicts in the region could 
then spin out of control. 
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Russia’s public budgets are comprised of the federal 
budget (with spending of 17.8 percent of GDP in 
2017), regional and municipal budgets (11.7 percent), 
and the social security funds (11.6 percent).1 In ab-
solute figures, federal spending in 2017 was 16.4 tril-
lion rubles (€249 billion2) and consolidated expendi-
tures for all public budgets amounted to 32 trillion 
rubles (€485 billion). Since all of the various govern-
ment budgets are interlinked through extensive trans-
fers, total government spending (that is, the govern-
ment spending ratio) adds up to 35.2 percent of GDP. 
In the broadest sense, government-controlled enter-
prises also belong to the public sector. Only estimates 
are available as to these companies’ expenditures. 
Studies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
Russian economists estimate them at 29 to 30 percent 
of GDP.3 
 
1 All budget data are taken from the Russian Finance 
Ministry’s official statistics, Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkono-
micheskie pokazateli Rossijskoj Federacii [Financial and economic 
indicators of the Russian Federation], https://www.minfin.ru/ 
ru/statistics/. Data on GDP come from: Rosstat, Valovoj vnu-
trennij produkt [Gross Domestic Product], http://www.gks.ru/ 
free_doc/new_site/vvp/vvp-god/tab3.htm (both accessed 
2 February 2018). See Appendices A and B, p. 42 and 43. 
2 To convert ruble amounts, we used the average exchange 
rate for 2017 (€1 is equivalent to 65.94 rubles), “Euro (EUR) 
to Russian Ruble (RUB) Average Annual Exchange Rate 
1999–2017”, Statista (online), 2018, http://www.statista. 
com/statistics/412824/euro-to-ruble-average-annual-exchange-
rate/ (accessed 27 March 2018). 
3 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Russian Federation: 
Fiscal Transparency Evaluation, IMF Country Report 14/134 
(Washington, D.C., May 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14134.pdf (accessed 30 December 2017); 
Alexander Abramov, Alexander Radygin and Maria Cher-
nova, “State-Owned Enterprises in the Russian Market. 
Ownership Structure and their Role in the Economy”, Russian 
Journal of Economics 3, no. 1 (2017): 1–23. 
It’s not just the oil price 
Oil and gas extraction taxes and export tariffs have 
made up around half of all federal and a quarter of 
total tax revenues in Russia since the mid-2000s (see 
Appendices A and B, p. 42 and 43). During the oil 
boom of 2010–2014, annual revenues from oil and 
gas sales amounted to 9 percent of GDP. At first glance, 
this does not seem to place Russia in the category 
of “rentier states”, which derive the lion’s share4 of 
their tax revenues from sales of oil and gas. In Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq, energy 
revenues make up over 80 percent of the total govern-
ment budget.5 In Russia, however, non-oil tax rev-
enues depend in part on energy exports as well. Energy 
companies play an important role, for instance, in 
corporate and individual income taxes. Taken at face 
value, the budget figures also conceal the fact that 
domestic gas supply is cross-subsidized in the Russian 
economy by revenues from gas exports.6 
The oil price slump of 2014 had a severe negative 
effect on federal tax revenues. Although the floating 
of the ruble exchange rate absorbed some of the shock, 
revenues fell by more than one third up to 2016 to 
just 5.6 percent of GDP, which resulted in a federal 
budget deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP. Without two 
major privatizations (Rosneft and Bashneft), the defi-
cit would have been as high as 4.6 percent of GDP in 
 
4 A frequently used threshold value in the literature is 
40 percent, see Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production 
States. A Theoretical Framework”, in The Arab State, ed. Gia-
como Luciani (Berkeley, 1990), 70. 
5 IMF, Revenue Administration. Administering Revenues from 
Natural Resources – A Short Primer (Washington, D.C., July 
2014), 4. 
6 Stefan Wagstyl, “Russia: Riding with the Rentiers”, Finan-
cial Times, 8 July 2011, https://www.ft.com/content/ab44f357-
5e42-3ecd-a96f-415bbd42db08 (accessed 26 March 2018). 
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2016. The average oil price in 2016 was $41.9.7 
Against the backdrop of a renewed increase in oil 
prices in 2017 (to an average of $53.3), the deficit 
fell to 1.4 percent of GDP.  
The reduced revenues from oil and gas sales are 
responsible for just part of the current budget im-
balance. Revenues from other areas have been in 
decline for several years now. This is true especially 
of corporate and individual income taxes, which 
 
7 The price of Urals, the reference oil brand used for 
pricing Russian oil, Minfin Rossii, O srednej cene nefti marki 
Urals po itogam janvarja – dekabrja 2017 goda [on the average 
price of Urals oil from January–December 2017], 14 Febru-
ary 2018, https://www.minfin.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=34979 
(accessed 12 March 2018). 
made up 10 percent of GDP in 2008 but just 6.2 per-
cent of GDP in 2013 (before the oil price drop). Since 
these taxes accrue mainly to regional budgets, the 
regions’ debts increased substantially over this period. 
The situation was exacerbated further in 2012 after 
Vladimir Putin laid out goals for his third term of 
office in his May Decrees that placed a heavy strain 
on regional budgets.8 Pay increases for civil servants 
played a significant role in this. The risks of regional 
debt are ultimately borne by the federal budget. Re-
gional debt is distributed extremely unequally across 
 
8 Alexander Libman, Russische Regionen. Sichere Basis oder 
Quelle der Instabilität für den Kreml?, SWP-Studie 19/2016 (Ber-
lin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2016), 13. 
Figure 1 
Federal budget revenues and balance (in percent of GDP) as of May 2018 
Budget planning figures were used for the years 2018–2020. 
At the end of May 2018, a new budget bill was introduced in the Russian Duma taking the sharply increased oil price from 2018 
into account. As a result of this, revenues are 1.8 percent of GDP higher, and instead of a deficit of 1.3% percent of GDP, a surplus 
of 0.5 percent of GDP is expected, Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal’nogo Sobranija Rossijskoj Federacii, Zakonoproekt № 476242-7 
[draft law no. 476242-7], 29 May 2018, http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/476242-7. 
Source: Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkonomicheskie pokazateli Rossijskoj Federacii [Financial and economic indicators of the Russian 
Federation], https://www.minfin.ru/ru/statistics/ 
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Russia’s regions, but is low overall at just 2.4 percent 
of GDP.9 
The decline in non-oil revenues in the remaining 
budget balance up to 2014 was disguised by the boom 
in commodity prices. It only became evident in the 
non-oil deficit, an indicator published by the Russian 
Finance Ministry for the Russian budget’s oil depend-
ence. This budget deficit is hypothetical: tax revenues 
from oil and gas have been deducted from it. For 
2007, the non-oil deficit was still 3.3 percent of GDP; 
since the financial crisis, the budget deficit would 
have been between 9 and 10 percent of GDP without 
oil and gas revenues in most years. 
Economic growth is unlikely to ease 
budgetary strain in the years to come. 
According to estimates by Fitch Ratings, Russia 
would have needed an average oil price of $72 a bar-
rel in 2017 to balance its budget. This places Russia 
in the middle among the world’s major oil-exporting 
nations: Nigeria ($139), Bahrain ($84), and Angola 
($82) needed much higher prices. Kuwait ($45), Qatar 
($51), and the United Arab Emirates ($60) adjusted 
better to the lower oil price. Like Russia, Saudi Arabia 
was in the middle of the field in 2017, at $74 per 
barrel.10 
Economic growth is unlikely to ease the strain on 
budgets in the years to come. The Russian economy 
posted 1.5 percent growth in 2017,11 allowing it to 
leave the recessions of 2015 and 2016 behind. Yet 
forecasts for the coming years are less optimistic: 
growth rates are projected to be 1.7–1.8 percent 
up to 2020.12 
The background to Russia’s current long-term 
economic slump is a significant decline in potential 
 
9 At the end of 2017, regional debt was 2.1 trillion rubles 
(€31.8 billion). Data on regional debt are published in “Gosu-
darstvennyj dolg sub”ektov RF” [Public debt of Russian fed-
eral subjects], iMonitoring, 1 March 2018, http://iminfin.ru/ 
areas-of-analysis/budget/gosudarstvennyj-dolg-sub-ektov-rf? 
territory=14000000 (accessed 27 March 2018). 
10 According to estimates by Fitch Ratings, Claudia Car-
penter, “Kuwait Is Best Off, Nigeria Worst in Fitch’s 2017 
Oil Break-Even”, Bloomberg, 6 April 2017, https://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-06/kuwait-is-best-off-
nigeria-worst-in-fitch-s-2017-oil-break-even (accessed 20 De-
cember 2017). 
11 Rosstat, Valovoj vnutrennij produkt (see note 1). 
12 World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects. Broad-Based 
Upturn, but for How Long?, (Washington, D.C., 2018), 4. 
growth since the 2000s that is rooted in structural 
problems. Despite high potential returns on invest-
ment, large amounts of capital are exported and too 
little is invested in Russia. Private businesses have 
a difficult time in many sectors due to the lack of 
reliable property rights protections. The major state-
owned enterprises, whose share in the Russian econo-
my has increased even further in recent times, are 
less efficient than private businesses.13 
The difficult demographic situation in Russia at 
present is putting an additional damper on growth. 
Around one-third of economic growth from 1997 to 
2011 came from the “demographic dividends” of a 
growing working-age population – an extraordinarily 
favorable situation.14 What had once been a blessing 
increasingly became a curse, however: in 2017 alone, 
Russia’s working-age population dropped from 84.2 
to 83.2 million. A large cohort is currently leaving the 
labor market, while the cohort of young people enter-
ing the workforce is just half as large. Up to 2024, 
the Russian statistical office Rosstat expects a further 
decline to a working-age population of 77.9 million.15 
Western sanctions are also having a negative im-
pact on Russia’s prospects for the future. The immedi-
ate effect of the financial market sanctions imposed 
by the EU and USA during the crisis in the Ukraine 
peaked in late 2014 and 2015, but new risks arose in 
the summer of 2017 with the United States’ CAATS 
Act (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc-
tions Act), which is severely affecting Russian com-
panies with international business ties. Uncertainty 
about the future use of the various sanction mecha-
nisms mentioned in the act is impeding the Russian 
economy’s integration into international supply 
chains and access to Western capital markets. This 
in turn raises protectionist walls higher that were 
erected around the economy by Russian industrial 
policy from 2012–2018 during Putin’s third term 
of office.16 
 
13 Ibid.; Abramov, Radygin and Chernova, “State-Owned 
Enterprises” (see note 3). 
14 World Bank Group, Searching for a New Silver Age in Russia. 
The Drivers and Impacts of Population Aging, (Washington, D.C., 
2015), 10. 
15 Rosstat, Demografija [Demography], http://www.gks.ru/ 
wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/ 
demography/# (accessed 2 February 2018). 
16 Vladimir Ruvinskij and Marija Zheleznova, “Krugi 
rossijskoj toksichnosti. Kak daleko mogut zajti posledstvija 
novych amerikanskich sankcij” [Ripple effects of Russian 
toxicity. How far the impacts of the new American sanctions 
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The relatively low public debt (13.8 percent of GDP, 
including government guarantees)17 currently poses 
no danger to Russian budgetary stability. In the near 
future, however, new sanctions by the USA could 
trigger a sell-off of government bonds (see inset box 
on page 11). Based on its analysis of budgetary risks in 
Russia, the IMF pointed out that the financial liabil-
ities of government-controlled enterprises amounted 
 
can go], Vedomosti, 29 October 2017, https://www.vedomosti. 
ru/opinion/articles/2017/10/30/739760-krugi-toksichnosti 
(accessed 23 January 2018). 
17 Minfin Rossii, Gosudarstvennyj dolg [Public Debt], 9 Janu-
ary 2018, https://www.minfin.ru/ru/perfomance/public_debt/ 
(accessed 26 January 2018). 
to at least 102 percent of GDP.18 The majority of this 
was from government-controlled banks, whose share 
in the banking system had increased to 66 percent in 
2017 due to the nationalization of troubled banks.19 
These liabilities are offset by assets, but there is no 
consolidated report available analyzing the fiscal risks 
of government-controlled enterprises for the budget, 
making these risks very difficult to quantify. Particu-
 
18 IMF, Russian Federation: Fiscal Transparency Evaluation 
(see note 3). 
19 Inna Grigor’eva, “Dolju gosudarstva v bankach chotjat 
ogranichit’” [State ownership in banks is to be limited], 
Banki.ru, 20 October 2017, http://www.banki.ru/news/ 
bankpress/?id=10070588 (accessed 26 January 2018). 
Figure 2 
Russian Population by Age Groups (2015) 
Source: Diagram by author based on data from the United Nations, World Population Prospects 2017,  
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ (accessed 5 May 2018). 
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larly Russian banking supervision has proven in the 
past to be often inadequate.20 
However, for Russia, the risk of financial insolven-
cy is currently very low. Recent western financial 
 
20 Andrey Movchan, “How to Fix Russia’s Broken Banking 
System”, Financial Times, 14 January 2018, https://www.ft. 
com/content/b90754a8-f7c0-11e7-a4c9-bbdefa4f210b 
(accessed 15 January 2018). 
market sanctions also caused total foreign debt (gov-
ernment and private) to fall to $529.1 billion. At the 
same time, the Central Bank’s monetary reserves were 
around $449.8 billion in February 2018. Russia would 
Effects of possible US sanctions on Russian government bonds 
In the framework of the United States’ Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2017, the 
Treasury Department was directed to submit a detailed report 
on the consequences of the United States imposing sanctions 
on Russian government bonds.
a
 If the US president sanctioned 
existing government bonds, both eurobonds (a bond denomi-
nated in a foreign currency) and government bonds denominated 
in rubles (Obligatsii Federalnovo Zaima, OFZ) would no longer be 
tradeable by foreign investors after a transitional period. The 
Russian government’s eurobonds had a total value of $49.8 
billion in early 2018, one-third of which was held by non-
resident investors ($15.1 billion). The total value of the OFZ 
was 6.8 trillion rubles (€103.5 billion), although bonds with a 
volume of 2.3 trillion (€35.4 billion) were held by foreigners.
b
 
If sanctions were imposed on existing Russian government 
bonds, many foreign investors would have to sell their hold-
ings quickly. As a result, more capital would flow out of Rus-
sia and the ruble would come under downward pressure. 
Estimates suggest that the ruble would depreciate by around 
10 percent,
c
 accompanied by higher rates of inflation.
d
 Returns 
on Russian government bonds would also increase, although the 
 Head of the Central Bank of Russia, Elvira Nabiullina, estimated 
that this effect would be 0.3–0.4 percent. Other estimates 
predict a much larger increase of 2 percent. In 2017, returns 
fluctuated between 7.5 and 8.5 percent.
e
 
In its 2018 report on this sanction mechanism, the US 
Treasury warned of much stronger repercussions that could 
even go as far as destabilizing Russian financial markets. The 
report focused, however, on a more benign variant that would 
only impose sanctions on new bonds issuance. Yet even in 
this case, if investors reacted to the potential sanctions with 
preemptive caution, the results could affect current bond 
holdings as well.
f
 
In the short term, the effects of the sanctions would be 
clearly palpable in Russia, but the potential for new domestic 
borrowing would not be threatened. The Central Bank has 
announced that in the case of a sell-off by foreign investors, it 
would intervene by purchasing bonds. The Finance Ministry is 
also working to reduce its vulnerability to sanctions by issuing 
its first bond on China’s capital market and by issuing what 
are known as “people’s bonds”, government federal bonds for 
private individuals in Russia.
g
  
a “Minfin Rossii ne stanet forsirovat’ vypusk evrobondov iz-za 
sankcij SŠA” [Russia’s Finance Ministry will not force the issu-
ance of eurobonds due to US sanctions], in: Vedomosti, 18 De-
cember 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/2017/ 
12/18/745646-minfin-rossii-ne-stanet-forsirovat-vipusk-
evrobondov-iz-za-sanktsii-ssha (accessed 26 January 2018). 
b Bank Rossii, Nominal’nyj ob"em obligacij federal’nogo zajma 
(OFZ), prinadlezhashchich nerezidentam, i dolja nerezidentov na 
rynke [Nominal value of foreign-held OFZ and the share 
held by non-resident investors], http://www.cbr.ru/ 
statistics/credit_statistics/debt/table_ofz.xlsx; ibid., Vlozhenija 
nerezidentov v evroobligacii Rossijskoj Federacii [Foreign invest-
ments in eurobonds of the Russian Federaton], http://www. 
cbr.ru/statistics/credit_statistics/debt/72_eurobonds.xls; 
Minfin Rossii, Gosudarstvennyj vneshnij dolg Rossijskoj Federacii 
(2011–2018 gg.) [Government foreign debt of the Russian 
Federation (2011–2018)], https://www.minfin.ru/common/ 
upload/library/2018/05/main/Obem_gos.vnesh.dolga_ 
20180501.xlsx (all accessed 8 June 2018). 
 c Danil Sedlov and Julija Titova, “Vozhidanii sankcij. Kak 
amerikancy mogut obrushit’ rubl’” [In expectation of sanc-
tions. How the Americans could cause the ruble to collapse], 
Forbes, 21 November 2017, http://www.forbes.ru/finansy-i-
investicii/353045-v-ozhidanii-sankciy-kak-amerikancy-mogut-
obrushit-rubl (accessed 2 February 2018). 
d Tat’yana Lomskaya, “Centrobank minimal’no snizit stavku 
iz-za ugrozy novych sankcij” [Central Bank reduces prime 
interest rate minimally due to the danger of new sanctions], 
Vedomosti, 14 December 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/ 
economics/articles/2017/12/14/745198-tsentrobank-snizit-stavku 
(accessed 2 February 2018).. 
e For 10-year government bonds denominated in rubles (OFZ). 
f Erik Wasson/Saleha Mohsin, “Treasury Warns of Upheaval 
If U.S. Sanctions Russian Debt”, Bloomberg.com, 2 February 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2018-02-
02/treasury-warns-of-widespread-effects-of-russian-debt-
sanctions (accessed 5 February 2018). 
g Ibid.; Sedlov and Titova, “Vozhidanii sankcij” (see note c). 
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be able to use these funds to pay for its current im-
ports for 19 months.21 
Russia’s hidden liabilities 
It would be short-sighted to attribute Russia’s budget 
difficulties solely to the surprisingly sharp drop in 
the oil price. The budget will continue to fluctuate 
between deficit and surplus with the ups and downs 
in energy prices in the future. Long-term budget fore-
casts predict, however, that the surpluses will occur 
less often, and that the deficits will be deeper. 
Of course, a number of parameters for long-term 
budget forecasts are uncertain, particularly future 
economic growth and commodity prices. Never-
theless, the high predictability of demographic devel-
opments allows for an approximate calculation of 
future burdens. Russian experts have long pointed 
out that the situation would worsen in the 2020s and 
beyond. As early as 2013, economists at the Gaidar 
Institute in Moscow warned that government rev-
enues were likely to fall progressively further below 
expenditures in the long term.22 According to their 
estimates, all taxes would have to be raised by 49 
percent or all expenditures reduced by 33 percent in 
order to balance future public budgets. Russia’s long-
term “fiscal gap” of 14.6 percent of GDP per year – 
that is, the disparity between all future revenues and 
all future expenditures – is, according to the econo-
mists’ estimates, even greater than that of countries 
that are deeply in debt today, such as Greece, Bel-
gium, and Japan (10 percent each) as well as Germany 
(5 percent).23 The gap is only gradually widening. Up 
to 2050, the forecast based on 2015 tax rates is an 
annual deficit of 11.7 percent of GDP (with expendi-
tures increasing to 40.7 percent and revenues falling 
to 29 percent of GDP).24 
 
21 Bank Rossii, Vneshniy dolg Rossijskoj Federacii [Foreign 
debt of the Russian Federation], http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/ 
credit_statistics/debt/debt_new.xlsx (accessed 6 August 2018). 
22 Eugene Goryunov et al., Russia’s Fiscal Gap, NBER Work-
ing Paper 19608 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, November 2013). 
23 To calculate fiscal debt, all future government spending 
is deducted from all future tax revenues (at the respective 
current prices). For international comparability, this value is 
expressed as a percentage of future GDP (at current prices). 
24 Evgeny Goryunov, Lawrence Kotlikoff and Sergey Sinel-
nikov-Murylev, “The Fiscal Gap. An Estimate for Russia”, Rus-
sian Journal of Economics 1, no. 3 (2015): 250–51. 
As the financial room to manoeuver 
diminishes, the Russian government 
is forced to raise taxes and make 
people work longer into old age. 
In comparable calculations, the World Bank esti-
mates that Russian public debt could increase to 116 
percent of GDP by 2050, although as much as 250 
percent is possible depending on how productivity, 
demographics, and the oil price develop.25 The tax 
rates and pension levels assumed in these studies 
have already changed since Putin’s fourth term began 
in 2018. The studies do, however, clearly reveal what 
a comfortable situation the Russian treasury has en-
joyed for the last 20 years. As the financial room to 
manoeuver continues to diminish due to demographic 
developments, the Russian government is being 
forced to raise taxes and make people work longer 
into old age. 
Demographic change is a burden on budgets 
because it comes with a declining rate of employ-
ment, which causes government expenditures, espe-
cially within the pension system, to increase. Russia’s 
cumulative additional spending on pensions because 
of demographic change alone is estimated by the IMF 
to reach 97.9 percent of GDP by 2050.26 A similar 
level of reserves (instead of the close to 5 percent in 
the Russian welfare funds in 2018) would be required 
to counterbalance the impacts of demographic change 
on the current tax system up to 2050. 
The reason for the negative forecasts is not just 
Russia’s demographic development, but also the 
predicted stagnation of oil and gas production. The 
World Bank expects annual oil production in Russia 
to fall from 547.5 million tons in 2016 to 436 million 
tons by 2050. At the same time, gas production is ex-
pected to increase slightly, causing Russian the value 
of overall energy production to remain at 2017 levels 
up to 2050. 
It is problematic for Russia that such an impor-
tant economic sector – one that was responsible for 
over half of Russian exports in 2017 – is predicted 
to show no growth. For countries that face significant 
demographic challenges, the solution typically cen-
ters around “growing out” of the expected burdens. 
 
25 World Bank Group, Balancing Economic Adjustment and 
Transformation, Russia Economic Report 34 (Washington, 
D.C., 2015), 46. 
26 IMF, Fiscal Monitor, October 2013. Taxing Times (Washing-
ton, D.C., October 2013), 81. 
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The dominance of resource exports is thus a stum-
bling block on the path out of future debt. 
For the Russian economy, the best chances of long-
term growth lie outside of oil and gas. Companies 
outside the energy sector are much more dependent, 
however, on the provision of public goods. They 
require higher public investments than gas and 
oil producers, for instance, in infrastructure or the 
educational system. Improving the neglected eco-
nomic potential outside the energy sector would 
therefore initially require increased government 
expenditures.27 
This reveals the dilemma currently facing the Rus-
sian leadership: on the one hand, major investments 
and possibly expensive structural reforms are needed 
to escape the long-term debt trap through growth. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to rapidly build 
reserves to pay for future pensions. Due to the cur-
rent overall low percentage of government revenues 
(33.7 percent of GDP in 2017), Russia has to make 
more significant changes in relative terms than, for 
instance, Belgium (51.1 percent of GDP), which is 
confronted with a comparable increase in expen-
 
27 Ibid.; World Bank Group, Balancing Economic Adjustment 
and Transformation (see note 25). 
ditures – and these changes will have a palpable 
impact on the Russian population.28 
Volatile oil price putting a strain on 
budget discipline 
The Finance Ministry’s reserves were the pride of 
Russian fiscal policy in the 2000s, but Russia’s sover-
eign wealth funds were never comparable in size to 
those of other oil-producing countries. In the United 
Arab Emirates, Norway, and Saudi Arabia, reserves 
amount to over 100 percent of GDP. In early 2009, 
Russian reserves reached their highest level to date 
at 16 percent of GDP. In 2015, just 11 percent of GDP 
remained. One of the two sovereign wealth funds 
(the reserve fund) was then used up entirely to cover 
budget deficits, and at the end of 2017 it was dis-
solved. The reserves in the second fund (national wel-
fare fund) still made up 3.9 percent of GDP at the end 
 
28 On Belgian government revenue, see Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Belgium. Annual Data and Forecast, https:// 
country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1866770970&Country
=Belgium (accessed 8 June 2018). On Russian revenue, see 
Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkonomicheskie pokazateli Rossijskoj 
Federacii (see note 1). 
Figure 3 
Russia’s long-term fiscal gap compared to other countries (in % of GDP) 
Source: Evgeny Goryunov, Lawrence Kotlikoff and Sergey Sinelnikov-Murylev, “The Fiscal Gap. An Estimate for Russia”, 
Russian Journal of Economics 1, no. 3 (2015): 254. 
Diminishing Room to Manoeuver 
SWP Berlin 
Mounting Pressure on Russia’s Government Budget 
February 2019 
14 
of 2017, but this was only partially invested in liquid 
assets (2.3 trillion rubles, or €35 billion) and thus 
could only partially be used to cover future deficits.29 
Although the welfare fund was designed to provide 
long-term protection for the pension system, some of 
the funds were used for high-risk financing of state-
owned businesses and infrastructural projects such 
as the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The partial 
misuse and low volume of the reserve funds show 
the monumental political difficulties the government 
in Moscow is facing when it comes to sustainable 
management of Russia’s resource wealth. 
Up to now in Russia, fiscal rules have had a limited 
lifespan, regularly falling victim to the temptations 
of an expansive fiscal policy. The first fiscal rule, in-
troduced in 2004 under then Finance Minister Alexei 
Kudrin, stipulated that just part of the surging oil and 
gas revenues could be used for current spending. 
This freely usable part was determined by calculating 
revenues based on a fictitious oil price of $20: All rev-
enues above this level had to be transferred to a “sta-
bilization fund.” In light of the rising oil prices, the 
rule was weakened in the year 2007 and a new thresh-
old value of $27 was set. In 2008, a new rule was 
established that again raised the threshold value to 
 
29 Pravitel’stvo Rossii, Zasedanie Pravitel’stva 7 December 
2017 [Meeting of the Government, 7 December 2017], http:// 
government.ru/news/30441/ (accessed 26 January 2018). 
$45. This second rule was suspended in the following 
year to allow the additional funds to be used for a 
comprehensive stimulus package during the financial 
crisis. The third rule ($91, introduced in 2012) already 
became obsolete shortly after its introduction, when 
the oil price fell by half in 2014.30 
As of early 2018, Russia has a new fiscal rule in 
place, again with a low oil price of just $40 as its 
threshold value. Budget plans for the years 2018 to 
2020 are based on annual oil and gas revenues of 
only around 5 percent of GDP. The oil price in fact 
rose to over $60 at the end of 2017 and to around $70 
in 2018, so revenues should be higher than estimated. 
Whether or not the Russian government will exercise 
the necessary fiscal discipline remains questionable 
in view of the short lifespan of past fiscal rules.  
 
30 Dmitry Butrin, “Bjudzhetnoe pravilo 4.0” [Budget rule 
4.0], Kommersant, 6 June 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/ 
doc/3318593 (accessed 6 June 2017). 
Figure 4 
Change in expenditures for the pension system up to 2050 (in % of GDP) 
Source: IMF, Fiscal Monitor, October 2013. Taxing Times (Washington, D.C., October 2013). 
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Fiscal Rules 
Fiscal rules are legal provisions that are designed to ensure the 
long-term sustainability of budget policy. A fiscal rule is also 
enshrined in the German constitution in the form of the “debt 
brake”, (Basic Law, Art. 109 and 115), which limits new struc-
tural debt to 0.35 percent of GDP.
a
 
When a country exports a large amount of its (finite) 
resources, a fiscal rule can be used to establish that only a 
portion of the revenues will be used and the rest will be saved. 
This ensures that future generations will also profit from the 
country’s resource wealth and isolates the government budget 
to some extent from major commodity price fluctuations. Fis-
cal rules can help to reduce negative effects of commodity 
exports on other economic sectors, known in economic jargon 
as the “Dutch disease”. 
 Government reserves are generally invested in low-risk 
foreign securities such as US or European government bonds. 
This prevents currency appreciation in boom periods and 
protects reserves from depreciation in times of crisis. If the 
fiscal rule is followed closely, pro-cyclical fiscal policy – that 
is, a fiscal policy that intensifies cyclical economic effects – 
becomes less likely, and the financial and political risks of 
fluctuating commodity prices sink. Comparative studies show, 
however, that fiscal rules are only effective in the long term 
under specific institutional conditions.
b
 In Norway, for in-
stance, an independent parliament, independent courts of 
law, and political competition would make it very difficult 
for the government to weaken its fiscal rule. In Russia, in 
contrast, there is no entity that could protect the fiscal rule 
from a change of priorities in the Kremlin. 
a Christian Kastrop, Gisela Meister-Scheufelen, Margaretha 
Sudhof and Werner Ebert, “Konzept und Herausforderungen 
der Schuldenbremse” [Concept and challenges of the debt 
brake], Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 62, no. 13 (2012), http:// 
www.bpb.de/apuz/126016/konzept-und-herausforderungen-der-
schuldenbremse?p=all (accessed 9 March 2018). 
 
b IMF, The Commodities Roller Coaster. A Fiscal Framework for 
Uncertain Times (Washington, D.C., October 2015), 8, http:// 
www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2016/12/31/The-
Commodities-Roller-Coaster (accessed 11 August 2017). 
Figure 5 
The Finance Ministry’s fiscal rule, oil price, and reserves 
 
Sources: Reserves and oil price: Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkonomicheskie pokazateli Rossijskoj Federacii (see also note 1); Fiscal rule: 
Dmitrij Butrin, “Bjudzhetnoe pravilo 4.0” [budget rule 4.0], Kommersant, 6 June 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3318593. 
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Budget imbalances in recent years have significantly 
increased pressure on the Russian government for 
reforms. A second or third “2016” with oil prices 
around $40 could make it necessary to implement 
austerity measures, which would further threaten 
the regime’s popularity.  
Until recently, the Russian Finance Ministry has 
had few policy options to substantially increase rev-
enues. At the end of 2014, President Putin announced 
a moratorium on tax increases that would apply up 
to the 2018 presidential election.31 The Finance Minis-
try nevertheless attempted to boost federal revenues 
through a variety of smaller adjustments. For in-
stance, the government sold its shares in oil produc-
ers Rosneft and Bashneft. Capital accumulation, one 
of the pillars of the Russian pension system, was 
suspended in favor of a pay-as-you-go system so that 
all contributions could go toward ongoing pension 
payments. In the case of the corporate income tax, 
the possibilities for companies to carry forward losses 
have been limited.32 At the same time, a portion of 
the revenues from the corporate income tax has been 
shifted from the regional to the federal budget.33 
Production taxes for the oil industry were increased, 
while the planned reduction of export tariffs was 
postponed.34 To balance the effects of the increased 
 
31 Sergej Titov, “Putin prizval vvesti moratorij na izmene-
nie nalogovoj nagruzki” [Putin called for a moratorium on 
the change in the tax burden], Vedomosti, 4 December 2014, 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2014/12/04/putin-
prizval-vvesti-moratorij-na-izmenenie-nalogovoj (accessed 
31 December 2017). 
32 “Perenos ubytkov v 2017 godu” [Loss carried forward 
in 2017], Buchgalterija.ru, 17 January 2017, http://www. 
buhgalteria.ru/article/n154921 (accessed 24 August 2017). 
33 Elizaveta Bazanova, “Pochti 100 mlrd rublej zarabota-
jut regiony na nalogovych izmenenijach” [Regions to gain 
almost 100 billion rubles through tax changes], Vedomosti, 
2 March 2017), https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/ 
articles/2017/03/02/679613-zarabotayut-regioni-nalogovih-
izmeneniyah (accessed 24 August 2017). 
34 Fares Kil’zie, “NDPI: differencirovat’, a ne podnimat’” 
[NDPI (= extraction taxes): Differentiate, don’t raise], Vedo-
oil production tax on the Russian fuel market, a 
reduction of the gasoline tax was planned,35 but 
instead, the gasoline tax was significantly increased 
as well,36 and like with the corporate income tax, 
revenues were redistributed from regional budgets 
to the federal budget.37 The attempt to increase divi-
dends from state-controlled joint stock companies 
partially failed, however, due to these companies’ 
resistance.38 
The Finance Ministry attempted to 
increase federal revenues through a 
series of smaller adjustments. 
Part of the losses in oil revenues were absorbed in 
this way, but the majority of measures implemented 
are not sufficient to increase tax revenues on a long-
term basis. Either they could only be implemented 
once (privatization) or they increased current tax rev-
enues at the expense of future budget years (pensions, 
corporate income taxes). The redistribution of regional 
revenues will not ease the federal budget in the long 
term because Moscow will ultimately have to take 
the responsibility for regional debt. 
Before the tax and retirement age adjustment 
announced in 2018, the biggest adjustments were 
planned on the expenditure side. General govern-
 
mosti, 10 March 2016, https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/ 
articles/2016/03/10/632959-ndpi (accessed 1 September 2017). 
35 Yuri Barsukov, “V bjudzhet dol’jut benzina. Neftjaniki 
chotjat razdelit’ nalogovoe bremja s potrebiteljami” [The 
budget is being filled up with gas], Kommersant, 15 September 
2016, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3089123 (accessed 
28 January 2018). 
36 Ol’ga Mordjushenko, “Dorogie akcizy – regulirovanie 
rynka” [High excise taxes – market regulation], Kommersant, 
14 April 2016, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2962740 
(accessed 31 August 2017). 
37 Ekaterina Mereminskaya and Ol’ga Adamchuk, “1 rubl’ 
ot Putina” [1 ruble from Putin], Vedomosti, 23 June 2017, 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2017/06/23/ 
695653-rubl-putina (accessed 30 August 2017). 
38 See below, p. 33. 
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ment spending in 2017, 35.2 percent of GDP, was un-
affected by the fall in the oil price to 2014 levels (34.9 
percent). The federal portion thereof fell slightly from 
18.7 percent to 17.8 percent. Significantly more radi-
cal steps are planned for the years to come: the budget 
adopted at the end of 2017 for the period 2018–2020 
envisions a reduction in federal spending to 15.6 
percent of GDP. 
Looking at the spending categories in detail, the 
political sensitivity of these planned cuts becomes 
apparent: Two thirds of budget cuts are planned in 
the categories of defense (planned cuts of 17.6 per-
cent)39 and social policy (16 percent) – areas in which 
virtually no cuts have been achieved up to 2017. 
Spending cuts in both of these areas are risky for the 
Russian leadership since they will affect the Kremlin’s 
most important supporters. Under President Vladimir 
Putin, social policy and the defense sector were devel-
oped with the explicit aim of bolstering the regime’s 
 
39 All relative figures refer to changes in spending relative 
to GDP. 
legitimacy. Yet these sectors contribute little to Rus-
sian economic growth. The question of whether the 
Russian regime will succeed with its spending adjust-
ments or whether a long-term destabilization of gov-
ernment finances is imminent will be determined 
above all in these two policy areas. 
Social and pension policy is becoming 
more expensive 
According to the 2018–2020 budget plan, the largest 
budget cuts relative to 2017 measured in percentage 
of GDP will be in the area of social policy. Including 
regional budgets and extrabudgetary funds, a decline 
of 2.1 percent of GDP is planned up to 2020, includ-
ing a 1.0 percent of GDP cut in the federal budget’s 
social spending. 
The social policy component of the budget is 
comprised largely of social benefits received by the 
population in the form of monetary transfers. The 
bulk of these (around 80 percent) consists of pension 
Figure 6 
Past and planned changes in spending (in percent of GDP) as of May 2018 
Source: Calculations by author based on Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkonomicheskie pokazateli Rossijskoj Federacii 
[Financial and economic indicators of the Russian Federation], https://www.minfin.ru/ru/statistics/ 
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payments. This budget item does not provide a com-
plete picture of all of the Russian government’s social 
policy activities, however. Some measures that are 
designed to protect socially or economically disad-
vantaged segments of the population are financed 
through other budget categories such as health and 
education. 
In many ways, Russia faces similar social policy 
challenges to other post-Soviet states. Rapidly increas-
ing inequality and high poverty rates have lent in-
creased urgency to questions of social justice and 
redistribution since the end of the Soviet Union. The 
population’s expectations about what the govern-
ment should provide are rooted in their experience in 
the Soviet welfare state. Redistribution plays a central 
role in the implicit social contracts within the region: 
citizens forego political participation in exchange for 
socio-economic stability. Reforms of the social system 
often meet with opposition from the population. 
Society’s acceptance of government social policy is 
therefore a key condition for the stability of the politi-
cal system.40 
The informal sector impedes 
targeted redistribution 
In Russia, over 80 percent of fiscal redistribution of 
income is achieved through pensions. This helps to 
attenuate the inequality in market incomes, which is 
extremely high by international comparison.41 Never-
theless, 20 million Russians live in poverty according 
to official Russian statistics. Economic growth in the 
2000s and rapidly rising pensions in the period that 
 
40 A theoretical discussion of the connection between 
social policy and regime stability can be found in Franziska 
Smolnik, Sozialpolitik und Regimestabilität im Südkaukasus. 
Das Beispiel Rentenreform, SWP-Studie 10/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2017). 
41 The Gini coefficient of income is 0.49 for market incomes, 
0.30 after redistribution, World Bank Group, The Russian 
Economy Inches Forward. Will that Suffice to Turn the Tide? Russia 
Economic Report 36 (Washington, D.C., November 2016). 
Figure 7 
Russia’s population below the poverty line, 2005–2016 (in millions of people) 
Source: Rosstat, Neravenstvo i bednost’ [inequality and poverty], http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/ 
statistics/population/poverty/# (accessed 2 February 2018). 
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followed caused the poverty rate to decline. Starting 
in 2014 with the economic crisis, poverty increased 
again. Pension levels are low by international com-
parison, at just 36 percent of average income. The 
majority of social transfers in Russia also do not go 
to the poorest sectors of the population but are dis-
tributed in a relatively indiscriminate way across 
income groups. This can be seen, for instance, in the 
basic pension: As a component of monthly pension 
payments, the basic pension is intended to guarantee 
a minimum level of social security. Pension rates are 
therefore differentiated into various categories of 
pension recipients or degrees of need. An evaluation 
of population census data from 2012 showed how 
badly this system is working: Only 20 percent of basic 
pensions paid ended up with the 20 percent poorest 
pension recipients.42 The unsystematic distribution of 
these funds means that the Russian government has 
to pay more than other countries for social policy in 
order to achieve a comparable reduction in inequality. 
An important reason for the relative lack of focus 
in social benefits is that the informal sector makes 
up a large percentage of the Russian economy. In 
2015, informal income made up 26.2 percent of total 
private household income. According to official data, 
around 21.2 percent of all workers were employed 
informally in 2016.43 Informal employment and the 
widespread employer practice of paying part of work-
ers’ salaries in cash without withholding taxes (“in 
the envelope”) makes it more difficult for Russian 
authorities to clearly identify the actual level of 
benefit recipients’ need. This in turn makes it very 
hard to provide social support to meet existing needs 
in a targeted way. Thus, pension recipients in infor-
mal employment receive their full government pen-
sion even though they are only eligible to receive a 
percentage thereof. Furthermore, workers in informal 
employment do not pay contributions into the social 
funds. Measures designed to ensure that transfers are 
better targeted to existing needs could have a counter-
productive effect, however: if government benefits 
were made to depend more heavily on formal wages 
and salaries, there would be the risk of more pension 
 
42 Evsej Gurvich and Juliya Sonina, “Mikroanaliz rossijskoj 
pensionnoj sistemy” [Microanalysis of the Russian pension 
system], Voprosy ėkonomiki, no. 2 (2012): 27–51. 
43 Anna Mogilevskaya, Anton Fejnberg and Ivan Tkachëv, 
“Neformal’naya ėkonomika v Rossii vyrosla do rekordnych 
razmerov” [Informal economy in Russia grew to record level], 
RBC, 17 April 2017, https://www.rbc.ru/economics/17/04/ 
2017/58f4b8789a7947c1418ff1af (accessed 26 January 2018). 
recipients attempting to engage in undeclared work, 
which would mean further growth in the informal 
sector.44 
Pensioners benefit from redistribution 
Overall, despite low pensions, pensioners in Russia 
are a net beneficiary of government redistribution. 
The legally guaranteed minimum pension is oriented 
toward a subsistence level of income calculated spe-
cifically for pensioners (as of 2017: 8500 rubles per 
month, or €129), which is slightly below the general 
poverty threshold (10,300 rubles per month, or €157). 
The proportion of pensioners living in poverty is, 
at 12.2 percent, below their proportion in the total 
population (21.6 percent). The losers in this “hori-
zontal” redistribution across different demographic 
groups are families and adults living alone, who 
make up an overproportional percentage of the poor 
population. Redistribution from rich to poor (“vertical 
redistribution”) scarcely takes place at all through the 
Russian government’s tax and social policy. 
The World Bank suspects that political considera-
tions could be behind the privileged position ac-
corded to pensioners, who play an important role as 
active voters and supporters of the Russian regime.45 
Surveys confirm the importance of this group: not 
only is support for Vladimir Putin highest in the 60+ 
age group (88.8 percent of the vote); in the 2018 
presidential election, expected voter participation in 
the 60+ age group was significantly above that in the 
young adult age group (18–24 years), at 86 percent 
and 47 percent, respectively.46 Opposition leader Ale-
xei Navalny, in contrast, is regarded with skepticism 
 
44 Tax policy faces a very similar problem: a more pro-
gresssive income tax could create a fairer distribution of the 
tax burden. But introducing such a tax would entail the risk 
that the informal sector of the economy could continue to 
grow; see World Bank Group, The Russian Economy Inches 
Forward (see note 41), 35. 
45 Luis F. López-Calva, Nora Lustig, Mikhail Matytsin et al., 
“Who Benefits from Fiscal Redistribution in the Russian Fed-
eration?”, in The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. Evi-
dence from Eight Low- and Middle-Income Countries, ed. Gabriela 
Inchauste and Nora Lustig (Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Group, 2017), 223. 
46 “VCIOM: 70% oproshennych rossijan zayavili, chto 
namereny prijti na vybory prezidenta RF” [WCIOM: 70 per-
cent of Russians surveyed stated that they are planning to 
vote in the RF presidential election], TASS, 20 December 2017, 
http://tass.ru/obschestvo/4826581 (accessed 27 March 2018). 
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by the older generation. In the Moscow’s 2013 mayoral 
election, where Navalny ran against Kremlin-backed 
candidate Sergei Sobyanin, the 60+ age group voted 
70 percent for Sobyanin and just 14 percent for Naval-
ny. In the 18–24 age group, Navalny beat Sobyanin 
with 53 to 35 percent of the vote.47 
The pension system is becoming more expensive 
for Russia every year, as the percentage of the popu-
lation that is dependent on government transfers 
grows. The proportion of pension recipients to em-
ployed people is shifting in Russia (as in many Euro-
pean countries), meaning that the pension fund 
depends on increasing transfers from the federal 
budget. A series of historically induced “demographic 
dips” in Russia have made this shift especially severe: 
Rosstat, the Russian statistical agency, predicts that 
the working-age population will shrink by 5 percent 
between 2018 and 2024, while the number of retired 
people will increase by 9.3 percent in the same peri-
od. This will require substantial transfers from the 
federal budget to the pension funds: In 2016, con-
tributions to the pension funds amounted to 4.8 per-
cent of Russian GDP, while pension payments were 
at 7 percent of GDP. The funding gap, which made up 
2.2 percent of GDP in 2016, could rise to 3.3 percent 
of GDP by 2024 due to the country’s changing demo-
graphics.48 An increase in the retirement age in Rus-
sia – which is currently 55 for women and 60 for 
men – has been called for repeatedly by the Finance 
Ministry and economists, but was not implemented 
for many years due to explicit opposition from the 
Russian president.49 Only in June 2018, after the 
presidential election, did Prime Minister Dmitri Med-
vedev announce that the government would raise the 
 
47 “Vybory v Moskve i Ekaterinburge: kto planiroval i kto 
prishel?” [Elections in Moscow and Yekaterinburg: Who 
planned to come and who came?], WCIOM (online), 25 Sep-
tember 2013, https://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid= 
114510 (accessed 27 March 2018). 
48 Calculations by author based on the budget of the 
pension fund, Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkonomicheskie poka-
zateli Rossijskoj Federacii (see note 1), and the evolution of 
employment figures: Rosstat, Demografija (see note 15). 
Assumption: pension payments and contributions develop 
proportionally to the population and GDP growth. 
49 “Putin rasskazal o svoem soprotivlenii povysheniju pen-
sionnogo vozrasta” [Putin expressed his resistance to the in-
crease in the retirement age], RBC, 17 December 2015, https:// 
www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/56729d879a794709f72589e6 
(accessed 28 January 2018). 
retirement age and the value-added tax in 2019, 
causing Putin’s popularity ratings to plummet.50 
Return to paternalism 
The Kremlin’s resistance to pension system reforms 
can be explained by the uniquely important role 
social policy plays in providing legitimacy to the 
Russian regime. While Putin pursued unpopular 
reforms inspired by economic liberalism in his first 
term of office, he embarked on a significant change 
of course in 2005. As a result, Russia again became 
a more paternalistic welfare state with a number of 
Soviet elements.51 
This change is considered to have been triggered 
by the wave of protests that engulfed all of Russia in 
the summer of 2004. The demonstrations were against 
what is known as the “monetization of privilege” 
(monetisaziya lgot). The government wanted to elimi-
nate special benefits for specific population groups 
like retirees and veterans (free use of public transport, 
free medications, health resort stays, etc.) and replace 
them with means-tested financial benefits. The pro-
tests soon led to the formulation of new political 
demands and focused increasingly on President Putin 
himself.52 The trust rating in the Russian president, 
a polling statistic compiled by the Levada Center, 
an independent public opinion research institute, 
reached a new low in 2005 at 38 percent.53 The 
demonstrations showed the extremely high willing-
ness of pension recipients to mobilize politically. 
 
50 Janis Kluge, Kremlin Launches Risiky Pension Reform. Plan to 
Raise Retirement Age Undermines Confidence in Russian Leadership, 
SWP Comment 28/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, July 2018). 
51 Linda J. Cook, “Russia’s Welfare Regime: The Shift 
toward Statism”, in Gazing at Welfare, Gender and Agency in Post-
Socialist Countries, ed. Maija Jäppinen et al. (Newcastle upon 
Tyne, 2011), 14–37. 
52 Irina Petrakova and Vadim Biserov, “L’gotniki sozhgli 
Putina” [Benefit recipients burned Putin], gazeta.ru, 28 Feb-
ruary 2005, https://www.gazeta.ru/2005/02/28/oa_149600. 
shtml (accessed 19 December 2017). 
53 “Rejting Putina upal do istoricheskogo minimuma” 
[Putin’s approval rating fell to historic low], Lenta.ru, 7 July 
2005, https://lenta.ru/news/2005/07/07/rating/ (accessed 
28 January 2018). 
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As oil prices rose, the pension system 
increasingly became an instrument 
for the redistribution of windfall 
tax revenues. 
The Kremlin reacted quickly: In Putin’s April 
2005 speech before the Russian Federal Assembly, 
he declared social policy to be the most important 
task facing all levels of government. The government 
drafted a series of development programs with a sig-
nificantly different focus from previous liberal-oriented 
reform plans. New transfers and benefits were intro-
duced without the requirement of thorough means-
testing. The “maternity capital” incentive – a one-
time payment of the equivalent of €17,000 (purchas-
ing power parity in the year the incentive was intro-
duced) to mothers on their child’s third birthday – 
became the government’s showpiece, symbolizing 
the new direction of its social policies. 
A media campaign flanked the return to a more 
paternalistic social policy. According to an analysis 
published in the state newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta on 
how social problems are reported on in Russia, media 
coverage starting in 2005 was aimed at presenting 
the government as the vanquisher of social problems. 
During the presidential election years 2008 and 2012 
in particular, praise far outweighed critique of the 
government’s social policies in media reports on 
poverty, inequality, and discrimination.54 
Russia’s expansive spending policy continued even 
after Putin moved to the position of Prime Minister 
in 2008. Against the backdrop of rising oil prices, the 
pension system increasingly became a rentier-state 
type instrument for the redistribution of windfall tax 
revenues.55 Inflation-adjusted pension payments in-
 
54 Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, Daria Prisyazhnyuk and Rostis-
lav Kononenko, “Representations of Inequality and Social 
Policy in the Russian Official Press, 2005–2012”, Journal of 
European Social Policy 26, no. 3 (2016): 268–80. 
55 On Russia, see also Alfio Cerami, “Welfare State Devel-
opments in the Russian Federation. Oil-led Social Policy and 
‘The Russian Miracle’”, Social Policy & Administration 43, no. 2 
(2009): 105–20; Andreas Heinrich and Heiko Pleines, “Ana-
lyse: Die politischen Herausforderungen eines Erdölbooms: 
Ressourcenfluch und politische Stabilität in Russland” 
[Analysis: The political challenges of a natural gas boom: 
resource curse and political stability in Russia], Russland-Ana-
lysen, no. 240 (2016): 7–13. On regime legitimization in 
rentier states: Kevin M. Morrison, “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and 
the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability”, Inter-
national Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 107–38; Uriel Abulof, 
creased 76 percent in the period 2007–2010 through 
annual pension increases and a revaluation of pre-
vious years of work. This was intended mainly to 
shield the population from the impacts of the 2009 
economic crisis. Yet in 2010, when the economy was 
growing again at a rate of 4.5 percent, pension pay-
ments increased further. Public transfers played an 
increasingly important role in the continuous in-
crease in Russians’ incomes, while private-sector 
wages made only a minor contribution to economic 
growth, especially after 2010.56 
Pensions increase oil dependence 
The large volume of pension payments and social 
benefits posed a particular risk to Russian budget 
stability: One the one hand, falling oil prices reduced 
government revenues, which are needed to finance 
transfers. An added challenge was that spending on 
social policy increased during the oil price slump. 
Since the dropping oil price meant that the ruble 
declined in value as well, imported consumer goods 
in Russia became more expensive, and consumer 
goods prices rose overall.57 Pension and social benefit 
recipients in Russia are legally guaranteed adjustment 
of their benefits for inflation. Due to this “scissors 
effect”, with revenues and expenditures moving in 
opposite direction, social policy spending exacerbates 
the Russian budget’s dependence on oil. 
When federal tax revenues fell nominally by 6 per-
cent, pensions had to be increased nominally by 11.4 
percent at the same time to compensate for the pre-
vious year’s inflation (additional spending amounting 
to 1 percent of GDP). In 2016 as well, tax revenues fell 
nominally, while pensioners were due another infla-
tion adjustment of 12.9 percent. With its reserves 
dwindling rapidly, the Finance Ministry pressed for 
an exemption to this rule. The Kremlin stalled on 
passing the resolution: first, the 2016 inflation adjust-
ment was split into two parts, with a first increase of 
4 percent in early 2016 and a second announced for 
the fall. This second increase did not take place, how-
ever: It was replaced by a one-time payment of 5,000 
 
“‘Can’t Buy Me Legitimacy’. The Elusive Stability of Mideast 
Rentier Regimes”, Journal of International Relations and Develop-
ment 20, no. 1 (2017): 55–79. 
56 World Bank Group, The Russian Economy Inches Forward 
(see note 41). 
57 This effect became more pronounced with the floating 
of the ruble course in November 2014. 
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rubles (€76) to all pensioners – a symbolic amount 
considering the level of inflation adjustment.58 
Compared to its decisions on other categories of 
budget spending, the Russian leadership acted very 
cautiously in deciding on pension inflation adjust-
ments. While it significantly reduced spending on 
education and health without any major discussion 
in 2015 and 2016, it only intervened into pension 
system expenditures when the Finance Ministry’s 
reserves were close to being exhausted. The matter 
was also decided only after an explicit vote by the 
president.59 
Regression instead of reform 
While the government kept rising social policy ex-
penditures in check by not following through with 
inflation adjustments, it was still not addressing 
fundamental problems such as the lack of focus in 
benefit provision and the looming risks of demo-
graphic change. 
One possible way to resolve the “informal sector 
dilemma” in the pension system would be an ap-
proach in which individuals receive a portion of their 
pensions through a funded pension system. Employ-
ees who report their income officially and whose 
employers make payroll social security contributions 
could then be rewarded accordingly. If contributors 
have trust in the pension system, a similar effect 
could be achieved through a pay-as-you-go scheme. 
Trust is very low in Russia, however, and has declined 
further due to the incomplete inflation adjustment 
of 2016 and the “freezing” of the previously existing 
funded pension scheme. 
A funded pillar was first introduced into the Rus-
sian pension system as part of the liberal reforms of 
2002. Of the individual’s pension contribution, which 
is currently 22 percent of gross wages, 6 percent was 
set aside in the name of the contributor for future 
pension benefits. In 2014, however, this fund was 
frozen, which means that the contributions are not 
 
58 Ol’ga Kuvshinova and Aleksandra Prokopenko, “Den’gi 
na razovuyu vyplatu pensioneram eshche predstoit najti” 
[Money still has to be found for one-time payment to pen-
sion recipients], Vedomosti, 24 August 2016, https://www. 
vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/08/24/654249-deneg-
indeksatsiyu-pensii-budut-iskat-razovuyu-viplatu (accessed 
25 August 2017). 
59 Marina Khmelnitskaya, “The Social Budget Policy Pro-
cess in Russia at a Time of Crisis”, Post-Communist Economies 
29, no. 4 (2017): 468. 
continuing to accumulate but are being diverted 
to cover ongoing pension payments. This helped to 
reduce transfers from the federal budget into the 
pension system. The savings are estimated at 342 
billion rubles (€5.2 billion) for 2016 auf, 412 billion 
rubles (€6.3 billion) for 2017, and 471 billion rubles 
(€7.1 billion) for 2018 (0.4–0.5 percent of GDP).60 
The decision to freeze accumulated individual pen-
sion savings has been extended multiple times 
already. There is currently no indication that the 
funded pillar will be reactivated, even in the draft 
budgets for the years up to 2020.61 A return to a sys-
tem in which pensioners are required to build up 
their own individual pension reserves is thus not 
likely. 
The burdens to the pension system 
are being hidden and shifted into 
the future. Although the budget 
deficit is declining, “implicit debt” 
is increasing. 
From the viewpoint of fiscal sustainability and 
transparency, the decision to freeze the funded pillar 
of the pension system was a step backwards. Not only 
does it render the burdens to the pension system 
invisible and shift them into the future; it means that 
even as the budget deficit is shrinking, “implicit debt” 
is on the rise. Government-guaranteed future pension 
payments that are not covered by reserves or future 
tax revenues create hidden government liabilities. 
Pension transfers that are saved today will have to 
be paid off out of the budget in the future.62 
 
60 Natalija Bijanova, “Chastnye pensionnye fondy mogut 
poluchit’ den’gi byvshich molchunov” [Private pension funds 
could receive money from the former ‘silent’ (= pension con-
tributors who did not state which pension funds should 
receive their contributions)], Vedomosti, 8 October 2015, 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2015/10/08/612034-
chastnie-pensionnie (accessed 25 August 2017). 
61 Alina Evstigneeva, “Moratorij po umolchaniju” [Implicit 
moratorium], Izvestiya, 2 August 2017, https://iz.ru/627023/ 
alina-evstigneeva/moratorii-na-pensionnye-nakopleniia-
prodliat-do-2021-goda (accessed 25 August 2017). 
62 On implicit debt, see Ognian Hishow, Die implizite öffent-
liche Schuld. Schuldenproblem “plus” der Europäischen Union, SWP-
Studie, 25/2010 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
October 2010). The measure reduces the demand for long-
term investment and increases the costs of financing invest-
ments. 
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No simple solutions 
In the context of the economic crisis and declining 
tax revenues, the Russian leadership has had few 
simple options for action in the field of social policy. 
The Kremlin had to choose between unpopular 
reforms and budget cuts that would jeopardize politi-
cal support from important voter groups, and a more 
debt-financed social policy that would increase me-
dium- to long-term budget risks. The middle course 
it decided to take is beset by both political and fiscal 
risks, but most likely poses no immediate danger to 
political stability.  
The political costs of this strategy are difficult to 
estimate, either from an outside perspective or by 
the Kremlin itself, since there are few forums for the 
public expression of dissatisfaction in Russia, and 
credible political alternatives are quashed before they 
can take root. Opinion surveys show, however, that 
public support for government social policy had been 
declining even before the controversial pension 
reform of 2018. The social policy index of the state 
survey research institute WCIOM, which has been 
collecting data on the subject since 2007, reached a 
new low in mid-2017. In 2015, 38 percent of the 
population reported being satisfied with social policy 
while 27 percent reported being dissatisfied. In mid-
2017, this distribution tipped in the opposite direc-
tion: just 25 percent reported being satisfied, while 
43 percent were dissatisfied.63 Studies by the Russian 
Academy of Sciences also show that the percentage 
of Russians who generally favor change increased 
dramatically in 2017 to over half of all respondents. 
The desire for change was less focused on political 
change, however. Sociologists reported a growing 
desire for a paternalist government that would play 
a stronger role in addressing the population’s social 
problems.64 
 
63 Satisfaction levels increased again in 2017, but the 
more recent figures are difficult to compare with past figures 
due to a change in survey methodology. Current data can 
be found in “Ocenka vlastej” [Evaluation of the authorities], 
WCIOM (online), https://wciom.ru/news/ratings/ocenka_ 
vlastej/ (accessed 27 March 2018). 
64 Andrej Kamakin, “Novyj srok Putina budet ochen’ tja-
zhelym dlja nego i strany” [New term of office will be diffi-
cult for Putin and for the country], Moskovskiy Komsomolec, 25 
January 2018, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2018/01/25/novyy-
srok-putina-budet-ochen-tyazhelym-dlya-nego-i-strany.html 
(accessed 28 January 2018). 
Procrastination on unpopular reforms and the 
increase in implicit debt that is not covered in the 
budget figures create new fiscal risks. The popula-
tion’s trust in the pension system – a key precondi-
tion for future reforms – has suffered from the gov-
ernment’s efforts at short-term budget savings.  
Defense expenditures are top priority 
The 2017 defense budget was 3.1 percent of GDP 
(€43.3 billion). Defense expenditures, which are paid 
almost completely out of the federal budget, varied 
widely in recent years, reaching a new peak at 4.4 
percent of GDP in 2016. In 2011, the defense budget 
was just 2.5 percent of GDP. The budgets project that 
defense expenditures up to 2020 will decline to 2.6 
percent of GDP. 
Russia is spending more on the military than its 
defense budget would suggest, however. Just three 
quarters of Russian military expenditures, classified 
according to the definition of the Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),65 actually 
come out of the defense budget. The rest, amounting 
to another 1 percent of GDP (€13.8 billion) in 2017, 
are paid for out of other budget categories such as 
social policy (military pensions), education, and 
health. 
Since 2008, the Kremlin has been pursuing a large-
scale reform and upgrade of the Russian armed forces 
with the aim of returning Russia to its former status 
as a military superpower.66 The turning point in Rus-
sian arms policy came with the Georgian War of 2008, 
when the weaknesses of the Russian army became 
clearly apparent.67 Part of the increase in spending 
went for the organizational restructuring of the mili-
tary: wages in the Russian armed forces were increased 
significantly in 2012 to attract qualified staff for a 
 
65 SIPRI, SIPRI Definition of Military Expenditure, https://www. 
sipri.org/databases/milex/definitions (accessed 2 February 
2018). 
66 Margarete Klein, Russlands Militärpotential zwischen Groß-
machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit. Zustand, Reformen und Entwick-
lungsperspektiven der russischen Streitkräfte [Russia’s military 
potential between superpower aspirations and reality. Con-
dition, reforms, and development perspectives of the Russian 
armed forces], SWP-Studie 24/2009 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, October 2009). 
67 Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military. How 
Moscow Reloaded”, Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (2016): 23–29. 
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professional army.68 But armaments account for most 
of the increase in military spending. 
Armament spending is planned as part of the long-
term programs known as Gosprogramma vooruzheniy 
(GPV, “state armament program”), which have a time 
horizon of ten years and are generally updated at five-
year intervals. The GPV-2020 program adopted in 
 
68 Andrzej Wilk, “A Significant Pay Increase in the Russian 
Army”, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich (online), 1 February 2012, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-02-01/a-
significant-pay-increase-russian-army (accessed 9 October 2017). 
2010 included a drastic increase in arms expenditure 
for the decade from 2011 to 2020. Over that time 
period, 19 trillion rubles were to be allocated to weap-
ons purchases (€472 billion at the exchange rate in 
2010 when the program was adopted or 41 percent of 
Russian GDP in 2010).69 The stated primary goal of the 
program was to increase the percentage of modern 
 
69 Ivan Safronov and Dmitrij Butrin, “Vooruzheniya vstu-
pili v boj s vozrazheniyami” [Arms in the struggle against 
objections], Kommersant, 19 February 2015, https://www. 
kommersant.ru/doc/2670562 (accessed 28 January 2018). 
Figure 8 
Defense budget, military spending, and arms (in percent of GDP) as of May 2018 
* Figures from the 2018–2020 budgets were used. 
Sources: Defense budget: Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkonomicheskie pokazateli Rossijskoj Federacii [Financial and economic indicators of 
the Russian Federation], https://www.minfin.ru/ru/statistics/; Military and arms spending: Julian Cooper, Prospects for Military Spending 
in Russia in 2017 and Beyond (Birmingham, 2017), https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-
society/crees/working-papers/prospects-for-military-spending-in-Russia-in-2017-and-beyond.pdf (accessed 2 October 2017). 
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weapons in the Russian military arsenal to 70 per-
cent by 2020. In September 2017, President Vladimir 
Putin announced that 58.3 percent of Russian mili-
tary weapons had already been modernized in the 
previous year.70 There is no clear definition of what 
 
70 “Putin provedet zasedanie voenno-promyshlennoj 
komissii” [Putin leads meeting of the military-industrial 
qualifies weapons systems as “modern” or which 
specific weapons stock the figures refer to, but sup-
plier figures on newly produced weapons show 
significant progress in production.71 
The process of planning the follow-up program 
(GPV-2025) indicates that the tense budget situation 
has at least temporarily dampened the Kremlin’s 
arms ambitions. The new strategy for the years 
2018–2027 includes spending in the amount of 19 
trillion rubles (€288 billion). In nominal terms, it is 
similar in volume to the predecessor program, GPV-
2020. As a percentage of GDP, the scope of the new 
arms program is just half of that (20.6 percent of 
GDP in the year of the program’s adoption, 2017). 
The resolution on the new arms program was also 
postponed repeatedly. A decision on the GPV-2025 
should have been made in 2015. In the light of the 
falling oil price and economic sanctions, this was put 
off again and again, as the Finance Ministry and the 
Defense Ministry had very different ideas about the 
scope of the budget, and the President chose not to 
exercise his authority to end the debate. In 2014, 
Putin had made relatively vague indications as to the 
overall direction it should take: he said the program 
should be realistic and within the government’s 
financial means.72 
The defense budget grew to a record 
high in 2016 with no direct 
connection to the preceding 
escalation of foreign policy crises in 
Ukraine and Syria. 
In contrast to the long-term armament programs, 
the change in defense spending from year to year 
does not necessarily indicate a change in the Krem-
lin’s priorities. From the outset, the GPV-2020 envi-
sioned a more dramatic increase in arms spending in 
the second half of the program period.73 The partially 
inconsistent trajectory of spending from 2011 on was 
 
commission], RIA Novosti, 19 September 2017, https://ria.ru/ 
defense_safety/20170919/1505029454.html (accessed 9 Octo-
ber 2017). 
71 Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, “Russian Re-
armament. An Assessment of Defense-Industrial Perfor-
mance”, Problems of Post-Communism 65, no. 3 (2018): 143–60. 
72 Safronov and Butrin, “Vooruzheniya vstupili v boj s voz-
razheniyami” (see note 69). 
73 Susanne Oxenstierna, “Russia’s Defense Spending and 
the Economic Decline”, Journal of Eurasian Studies 7, no. 1 
(2016): 60–70. 
Direct Spending on Military Operations 
in Ukraine and Syria 
According to estimates, the direct costs of Russian military 
operations in Syria and Ukraine make up just a few percent 
of the Russian defense budget, which amounted to around 
€43.3 billion in 2017. The necessary expenditures could thus 
be covered entirely through reallocations, for instance from 
the budget for military exercises, without any added burden 
on the budget. 
As the government provides almost no official figures, 
and most of the data on military exercises are classified as 
secret, the available sources consist either of information 
compiled by journalists or independent studies – for in-
stance, those released by the opposition party Yabloko. 
In the case of Syria, the fact base is slightly better due the 
somewhat lower level of secrecy. In March 2016, President 
Putin stated that the first six months of the Syrian operation 
cost 33 billion rubles (€500 million). Russian experts esti-
mate the costs of the operation from October 2015 to Sep-
tember 2017 at between 188.6 and 194.3 billion rubles 
(€2.9–3 billion).
a
 
The costs of the military operation in Donbas (independ-
ent of the annexation of Crimea) are estimated at 53 billion 
rubles (€800 million) for the first ten months (March to 
December 2014).
b
 
Russian economist Sergey Aleksashenko assumes $2 bil-
lion for the year 2015. That just covers the direct costs of pay 
and provisions for the deployed soldiers, but not the provi-
sions for refugees or economic assistance to the self-pro-
claimed “people’s republics” in Donbas.
c
 
a Yabloko, Rossija potratila na Siriju ot 188.6 do 194.3 mlrd 
rublej [Russia spent 188.6 to 194.3 billion rubles on Syria], 
2017, http://www.yabloko.ru/news/2017/09/22 (accessed 8 June 
2018). 
b Ilya Yashin and Olga Shorina (eds.), Putin.War. Based 
on Materials from Boris Nemtsov (Moscow, May 2015), http:// 
4freerussia.org/putin.war/Putin.War-Eng.pdf (accessed 
3 October 2017). 
c Reva Bhalla, “The Logic and Risks Behind Russia’s Statelet 
Sponsorship”, Stratfor, September 2015, https://www.stratfor. 
com/weekly/logic-and-risks-behind-russias-statelet-sponsor 
ship (accessed 24 June 2017). 
Obstacles in Budget Policy 
SWP Berlin 
Mounting Pressure on Russia’s Government Budget 
February 2019 
26 
also due to the mode of financing military spending: 
armaments industries had received government guar-
antees for loans in the amount of around 1.2 trillion 
rubles (€18 billion) to start fulfilling arms contracts 
immediately.74 These guarantees are not contained in 
the defense expenditures in the early years. Starting 
in 2016, the Finance Ministry ended the practice of 
using bank loans to provide co-financing, and paid 
off the majority of the loans (793 billion rubles, or 
€12 billion). A further repayment took place in 2017 
(approx. 200 billion rubles, or €3 billion). These pay-
ments caused the defense budget to reach a record 
high for a period of 2016, with no direct connection 
to the preceding escalation of foreign policy crises in 
the Ukraine conflict and in Syria. 
Coalition for arms 
The Kremlin’s security policy priorities only partially 
explain the increase in spending on long-term Rus-
sian arms programs. The systematic implementation 
of the wide-ranging GPV-2020 is also rooted in a par-
ticular constellation of domestic and industrial policy 
factors. 
The most important decisions on the state defense 
orders are made by the military-industrial commis-
sion, whose individual members have a military or 
secret service background. Significant overlapping 
of responsibilities makes it easier for the military 
to assert its particular interests in the planning of 
expenditures: the defense ministry not only acts as 
arms buyer but is also responsible for evaluating the 
urgency of certain purchases and for planning supply 
needs. There are also major overlaps in staffing be-
tween the management of arms manufacturers, the 
presidential administration, the security agencies, 
and the military.75 The political weight of influential 
military-industrial interest groups has increased fur-
ther with the expansion of defense spending. Further-
more, the Minister of Defense since 2012, Sergei 
Shoigu, is among the most popular politicians in Rus-
 
74 Anna Eremina, Aleksandra Prokopenko and Tat’jana 
Voronova, “Dosrochnye vyplaty po kreditam na oboronzakaz 
prinesut bankam 800 mlrd i golovnuju bol’“ [Early repay-
ment of loans for arms contracts costs banks 800 billion 
and causes headaches], Vedomosti, 14 December 2016, https:// 
www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2016/12/14/669471-dosroch 
noe-pogashenie-golovnuyu-bol (accessed 6 October 2017). 
75 Una Hakvåg, “Russian Defense Spending after 2010. 
The Interplay of Personal, Domestic, and Foreign Policy 
Interests”, Post-Soviet Affairs 33, no. 6 (2017): 496–510. 
sia and has the strongest individual political profile of 
all of the ministers.76 
In the public discourse, the drastic increase in 
arms spending has often been justified with indus-
trial policy arguments. Vladimir Putin likes to present 
the defense industry as an engine of growth for the 
Russian economy, although economists cast doubt on 
the industry’s ability to play this role. In many cities, 
however, arms manufacturers are among the most 
important and in some cases the only major employ-
ers. As a result, they play a highly significant socio-
economic role. 
The risks for the arms industry 
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the arms 
sector has become one of the most important political 
clienteles for the Russian leadership: the arms indus-
try employs around two million workers, whose sup-
port for the Kremlin regime is at times even instru-
mentalized in the state media. A prime example of this 
role can be seen in a television appearance by work-
ers for the company Uralvagonzavod, which among 
other things is building the platform for the new 
combat tank Armata. During Putin’s annual live tele-
vision conference, in which he takes call-in questions, 
they offered to come to Moscow and help clear the 
streets of the demonstrators who were protesting 
against electoral fraud in Winter of 2011/2012.77 
According to the data from the Ministry of Industry, 
arms industry production more than doubled be-
tween 2010 and 2016.78 The share of civilian produc-
tion in the arms industry fell during the period from 
33 percent (2011) to 16 percent (2015).79 The compa-
 
76 Konstantin Gaaze, Gibrid ili diktatura – 2. Kak slozhilas’ 
koaliciya vojny Vladimira Putina [Hybrid or dictatorship – 
2. How Putin’s coalition of war emerged] (Moscow: Carnegie 
Moscow Center, May 2015), http://carnegie.ru/commentary/ 
?fa=69995 (accessed 5 June 2017). 
77 Margarita Ljutova, “Putin poobeshchal modernizaciju 
podderzhavshemu ego ‘Uralvagonzavodu’” [Putin promised 
modernization of Uralvagonzavod, which supported him], 
Vedomosti, 10 May 2012, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/ 
articles/2012/05/10/putin_rasskazal_rabochim_uralvagon 
zavoda_pro_nachalo_samogo (accessed 9 February 2018). 
78 Gaidar Institute, Russian Economy in 2016. Trends and Out-
looks (Moscow, 2017), 468, https://iep.ru/files/text/trends/2016-
eng/Book.pdf (accessed 1 June 2017). 
79 Centr ėkonomicheskogo razvitija i sertifikacii, OPK: 
ternistyj put’ k diversifikacii [Military-industrial complex: Rocky 
path to diversification], 12 September 2016, https://profiok. 
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nies are largely oriented toward the Russian defense 
ministry as their main buyer. 
Table 1 
Year-on-year percentage growth in production 
of the Russian defense industry 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
17.4 5.8  6.4  13.5 15.5 12.9  10.1 
Source: Gaidar Institute, Russian Economy in 2016. Trends and 
Outlooks (Moscow, 2017). 
Due to their dependence on Russian state con-
tracts, managers and workers at the arms producers 
are uneasy that budget plans project a significant 
decline in military spending.80 President Putin and 
then Vice President Dmitri Rogozin, who was until 
recently responsible for the arms industry (replaced 
by Yuri Borisov in May 2018), see the future of the 
industry in the production of goods with civilian ap-
plications and want the companies to open up new 
export markets.81 
The Russian defense industry is being 
squeezed by high-tech western 
companies on the one side and 
cheaper Chinese manufacturers on 
the other. 
The Russian defense industry has been successful 
in selling its goods abroad in recent years, with ex-
ports of around $15 billion annually. But it is being 
squeezed by high-tech western companies on the 
one side and cheaper Chinese manufacturers on the 
other. For many years, China was one of the most 
important buyers of Russian weapons, but it has 
 
com/about/news/detail.php?ID=3349&sphrase_id=5523 
(accessed 2 February 2018). 
80 Roman Ryskal’, “Oboronka gotovitsja k potrebleniju” 
[Arms industry prepares for consumption], Kommersant, 
26 May 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3307198 
(accessed 2 February 2018). 
81 Julian Cooper, Prospects for Military Spending in Russia 
in 2017 and beyond (Birmingham, March 2017), https:// 
www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/ 
government-society/crees/working-papers/prospects-for-
military-spending-in-Russia-in-2017-and-beyond.pdf 
(accessed 2 October 2017). 
made great progress in its own weapons manufactur-
ing – in part through licensed production of Russian 
weapons systems. In recent times, Chinese providers 
have been penetrating markets such as Nigeria and 
Venezuela that were traditionally dominated by Rus-
sian arms suppliers. Given that Chinese arms produc-
ers possess the backing of a much more financially 
powerful state, as well as superiority in many produc-
tion processes, Russian producers will have a difficult 
time asserting themselves against Chinese competi-
tors in the future.82 With some weapons systems 
such as the air defense system S-400 or the fighter jet 
Su-35, the Russian industry still holds the techno-
logical lead. The combat tank Armata, which is one 
of few weapons systems developed after the end of 
the Cold War, has good chances of becoming inter-
nationally competitive as well – provided Russia 
decides to export it.83 
Whether there will be a successful and significant 
shift to civilian production is questionable since the 
arms industry’s own technological developments are 
either useful only for weapons systems or are classi-
fied as secret.84 As a result, it is being discussed wheth-
er the arms industry should be given preferential 
treatment in tenders by other state corporations as a 
kind of “start-up aid” for the sale of civilian goods.85 
The sanctions imposed during the Ukraine crisis 
and under the US CAATS Act made it more difficult 
for the Russian defense industry to gain access to 
capital and to import goods that it needed for produc-
 
82 Siemon Wezeman, “China, Russia and the Shifting Land-
scape of Arms Sales”, SIPRI (online), 5 July 2017, https://www. 
sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/china-
russia-and-shifting-landscape-arms-sales (accessed 10 October 
2017). 
83 Ibid.; Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, Russia’s 
Role as an Arms Exporter. The Strategic and Economic Importance of 
Arms Exports for Russia (London: Chatham House, March 2017), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/ 
publications/research/2017-03-20-russia-arms-exporter-
connolly-sendstad.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018). 
84 Aleksandr Trushin, “‘Voennaya nagruzka stala tormo-
zom’” [Defense burden became a brake], Kommersant, 
17 October 2016, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3114479 
(accessed 2 February 2018). 
85 Svetlana Bocharova and Aleksej Nikol’skij, “Putin soob-
shchil o prinjatii novoj gosprogrammy vooruzhenij” [Putin 
reported on the adopotion of the new state armament pro-
gram], Vedomosti, 24 January 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/ 
economics/articles/2018/01/24/748864-putin-vooruzhenii 
(accessed 2 February 2018). 
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tion.86 The loss of Ukrainian suppliers had already 
begun negatively impacting the sector in 2014. For 
Russian banks with international operations, the new 
sanctions substantially increased the risks of doing 
business with the arms industry.87 For this reason, 
Moscow created a special financial institution to sup-
port the defense industry on the foundations of 
Promsvyazbank, which the Russian central bank took 
over at the end of 2017 to prevent its collapse.88 
No change of course up to now 
It is unlikely that there will be a rapid change of 
course from the rearmament that has been pursued 
up to now. During the budget crisis of 2015 and 2016, 
the Russian leadership showed willingness to limit 
military spending. Yet even if the political will to do 
so could be maintained despite the recent rise in oil 
prices, the drastic cuts planned by the Finance Minis-
try would be difficult to implement for structural 
reasons. First of all, actors from the arms industry and 
military have a great deal of political weight in the 
decision-making process. In the last few years, for 
instance, they have repeatedly succeeded in having 
defense spending levels revised upward after budgets 
were passed. The growing foreign policy tensions 
between Russia and NATO are strengthening forces 
within the Kremlin that focus on security policy 
arguments. Second, due to sanctions, demographic 
developments, and increasing competition, the arms 
industry will have to battle increasing headwinds in 
the years to come. A significant decline in govern-
ment arms contracts would have a severe impact on 
arms producers and could destabilize the socio-eco-
nomic situation in a number of cities. 
 
86 Madalina Sisu Vicari and Nicholas Trickett, CAATSA 
Out of the Bag: Russia’s Arms Exports under Threat (Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2018), https://bearmarket 
brief.com/2018/01/23/the-caatsa-out-of-the-bag-russias-arms-
exports-under-threat/ (accessed 28 January 2018). 
87 Alina Didkovskaya, “Al’fa-bank prekratit sotrudnichat’ 
s oboronnymi predprijatijami iz-za sankcij” [Alfa Bank stops 
doing business with arms manufacturers due to sanctions], 
Vedomosti, 3 January 2018, https://www.vedomosti.ru/ 
finance/articles/2018/01/03/747066-alfa-bank (accessed 2 Feb-
ruary 2018). 
88 Max Seddon, “Moscow Creates Bank to Help It Avoid 
US Sanctions”, Financial Times, 19 January 2018, https://www. 
ft.com/content/90c73fe4-fd15-11e7-9b32-d7d59aace167 (ac-
cessed 28 January 2018). 
Ultimately, whether or not the planned budget 
reductions succeed will depend on arms producers’ 
flexibility – and this has been relatively low up to 
now. One can safely assume that the Kremlin will not 
allow these companies to fail, risking mass unem-
ployment in many of Russia’s monotowns. A newly 
established bank serving the arms industry and pos-
sible cross-subsidies from other state corporations will 
continue even if arms spending falls. This will create 
new risks that could materialize in future budgets, 
for instance, if borrowers default on loans from 
Promsvyazbank. 
Russian discourse: 
Concepts without consequences 
The future of arms and social policy spending plays 
a central role in the Russian (expert) discourse on 
reform plans. On explicit instructions from the Krem-
lin, two reform proposals were developed starting 
in 2016: On the one hand, there is the proposal by a 
team at the Center for Strategic Research, headed by 
the economist and former Minister of Finance Alexei 
Kudrin. On the other hand, there is the “strategy of 
growth” developed by the Stolypin Club, now under 
the leadership of Russian businessman and Presiden-
tial Commissioner for Entrepreneurs’ Rights Boris 
Titov.89 Whereas Kudrin’s perspective on Russian eco-
nomic policy is based more on neoclassical, supply-
side economics, Titov’s strategy is clearly rooted in 
the Keynesian, demand-oriented tradition. Kudrin’s 
plans are much more strongly rooted in current eco-
nomic literature. The two sides are in agreement on 
the urgent need for reform of the legal system as a 
precondition for better protection of property rights. 
On questions of budget policy, however, the two 
strategies take opposing positions. 
Kudrin’s fiscal manoeuver 
Kudrin proposes a redistribution of fiscal spending 
within the budget (“fiscal manoeuver”). He distin-
 
89 Under the internationally oriented businessman Boris 
Titow, the Stolypin Club has moved away from some of the 
nationalist ideas of previous head Sergey Glasyev, see Roland 
Götz, “Die Wirtschaftspolitik der belagerten Festung. Das 
Glasjew-Programm” [The economic policy of the besieged 
fortress. The Glazyev program], Russland-Analysen, no. 305 
(2015), 6–11, http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/ 
pdf/RusslandAnalysen305.pdf (accessed 2 February 2018). 
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guishes between expenditures in productive areas 
(such as education, health, and infrastructure), which 
have a positive impact on economic growth, and 
expenditures in unproductive areas, which have little 
or even a negative impact on growth (military and 
security).90 In the category of expenditures with a 
negative impact, Kudrin includes social transfers that 
do not reach the needy population they are targeted 
at but are instead distributed indiscriminately (these 
are not taken into consideration in the following 
statistical analysis, however, due to the lack of data). 
Table 2 
Effect of expenditures in the amount of 
1 percent of GDP on GDP and growth 
Budget category GDP Short-term 
growth 
Long-term 
growth 
Government 
spending (total) 
0.91 %   
Defense 0.22 %  –0.29 %  –0.52 % 
National security 0.78 %  0.26 %  –1.45 % 
Education 0.38 %  0.18 %  0.47 % 
Health & sports 1.25 %  0.09 %  0.14 % 
Infrastructure 1.64 %  0.26 %  –0.68 %a 
a The long-term negative effect of infrastructural spending is 
explained by the fact that many projects are not geared toward 
economic needs. This is true, for instance, of the megaprojects 
carried out in recent years (Olympic Games, Soccer World Cup, 
and Kerch Bridge). 
Source: Alexey Kudrin and Alexander Knobel, “Bjudzhetnaya 
politika kak istochnik ėkonomicheskogo rosta” [Budget policy 
as a source of economic growth], Voprosy ėkonomiki 26, no. 10 
(2017). 
An empirical analysis by Alexei Kudrin and Alexander 
Knobel shows that expenditures on health and infra-
structure in Russia lead to a disproportionate increase 
in GDP (1.25 percent and 1.64 percent, respectively, 
for every 1 percent of GDP increase in expenditures), 
while defense spending increases GDP little (0.22 per-
cent, see Table 2). Defense expenditures are even 
detrimental to long-term growth, while educational 
 
90 Alexey Kudrin and Alexander Knobel, “Bjudzhetnaya 
politika kak istochnik ėkonomicheskogo rosta” [Budget 
policy as a source of economic growth], Voprosy ėkonomiki 26, 
no. 10 (2017). 
spending in particular leads to positive growth 
effects. 
Based on their analysis of these contributions to 
economic growth, a comparison with other countries, 
and the effectiveness of the various ministries, Kudrin 
and his colleagues recommend increasing spending 
on infrastructure, education, and health care, and de-
creasing spending on defense, security, and a number 
of subsidies. On the subject of social policy, Kudrin 
highlights the potential for savings in the area of un-
targeted social transfers.91 His proposals thus strongly 
resemble those of the World Bank for Russian budget 
policy.92 
The Stolypin Club’s “strategy of growth”  
The authors of the Stolypin Club’s alternative pro-
posal call for a substantially more expansive mone-
tary policy on the part of the central bank to promote 
private investment. At the same time, pointing to 
unused production capacities in Russia, they recom-
mend boosting domestic demand through an increase 
in government spending to generate increased eco-
nomic growth.93 Their plan aims to achieve long-term 
budget equilibrium not through spending cuts but 
through the increase in tax revenues resulting from 
economic growth. Titov pairs his Keynesian perspec-
tive with a developmental state approach: According 
to this idea, active industrial policy and ongoing im-
port substitution will lead to the emergence of lead-
ing international enterprises in a variety of techno-
logical sectors. Titov and his colleagues expect that 
the defense industry will make a positive contribu-
tion to growth, and warn against a decrease in de-
fense spending.94 Overall the Stolypin Club’s ap-
 
91 Alexey Kudrin, “Bjudzhetnyj manevr i strukturnaya 
perestrojka rossijskoj ėkonomiki” [The budget maneuver and 
structural reform of the Russian economy], Voprosy ėkonomiki 
26, no. 9 (2017). 
92 Andrey Ostroukh, “World Bank Urges Russia to Spend 
More on Healthcare, Education”, Reuters, 16 January 2018, 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-worldbank-russia/world-
bank-urges-russia-to-spend-more-on-healthcare-education-
idUKKBN1F529F (accessed 2 February 2018). 
93 Boris Titov and Aleksandr Shirov, “Strategija rosta dlja 
Rossii” [Strategy of growth for Russia], Voprosy ėkonomiki 26, 
no. 12 (2017). 
94 Institut ėkonomiki rosta im. Stolypina P.A., Rol’ voenno-
promyshlennogo kompleksa v obespechenii ėkonomicheskogo rosta v 
RF [The role of the military-industrial complex in ensuring 
economic growth in the RF] (Moscow, November 2017), 
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proach is less systematic in its design and more eclec-
tic than Kudrin’s research-based recommendations. 
Low likelihood of implementation 
The Kremlin has shown no clear preference for either 
of the plans. After a presentation of the two reform 
papers, Putin suggested that a joint strategy be devel-
oped combining both concepts.95 In view of the con-
tradictions between a number of the recommenda-
tions, this would be virtually impossible to carry out. 
Overall, the reaction on the part of the Russian lead-
ership reveals a certain level of disinterest in the 
proposals for structural change. 
Putin’s apparent reluctance to make a decision in 
this regard is most likely rooted in the fact that both 
programs contain ideas that contradict the Kremlin’s 
current political priorities. Kudrin calls for wide-
spread cuts in areas affecting important political cli-
entele groups that currently depend on the “unpro-
ductive expenditures” in the budget. Titov’s proposal 
may entail too many economic risks: Above all, the 
dangers of inflation but also of increased government 
debt make a more expansive monetary and fiscal 
policy uninteresting to the Kremlin, which has tended 
to act in a more conservative way up to now. This am-
bivalence became clearly apparent in Putin’s address 
to the Federal Assembly in March of 2018. The an-
nouncements in the first part of his address strongly 
recalled Kudrin’s demands: increasing spending on 
education, health, and infrastructure. The second part 
glorified the successes of Russia’s military buildup. 
There was no mention of any decrease in military 
spending.96 
 
http://stolypinsky.club/2017/11/22/issledovanie-instituta-
ekonomiki-rosta-rol-oboronno-promyshlennogo-kompleksa-
v-obespechenii-ekonomicheskogo-rosta-v-rf/ (accessed 1 Feb-
ruary 2018). 
95 Vesti Finance, “Putin ocenil strategii Kudrina i Titova. 
Chto dal’she?” [Putin evaluated the strategies of Kudrin and 
Titov. Where do we go from here?], Vesti Finance, 31 May 
2017, http://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/86115 (accessed 
5 January 2018). 
96 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, Kremlin.ru, 
1 March 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/ 
56957 (accessed 30 April 2018). 
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Economic know-how and reform concepts can be 
found predominantly among the “liberals” within 
the Russian elite, who still hold important positions 
in the central bank, the Finance Ministry, and the 
government-owned Sberbank. In those contexts, how-
ever, they operate purely as technocrats and have 
only a limited scope of action. As political actors, the 
liberals are just as discredited in Russia as liberal 
political ideas themselves. This is due in part to the 
regime’s propaganda campaign dissociating it from 
the period of radical liberalization of the government 
and the economy in the 1990s. For the liberally in-
clined elite, the annexation of Crimea and the esca-
lation of foreign policy confrontation with the West 
meant even further weakening of their position in 
the domestic political landscape. 
Instruments of long-term voluntary 
commitment, such as budget plans 
and fiscal rules, require a minimum 
level of transparency and separation 
of powers to amount to more than 
just good intentions. 
Sustainable fiscal policy in Russia is inhibited by 
problems of expenditure control. Instruments of long-
term self-commitment such as budget plans and fiscal 
rules require a minimum level of transparency and 
separation of powers to amount to more than just 
good intentions. In reaction to the collapse of tax rev-
enues, however, control over budget funds became 
more centralized and less transparent. Some of the 
revenues also do not make it into budgets but remain 
with state-owned enterprises. This increases their 
political clout, and since they are profiteers of the 
status quo, they have no interest in a reform of Rus-
sian economic policy. 
Undermining the separation of powers 
By granting the parliament budgetary powers, the 
Russian constitution gives the State Duma and the 
Federation Council an effective instrument for shap-
ing public policy. In past years, however, Russia’s 
parliament has barely made use of this fundamental 
right in the sense set out in the constitution. After the 
acrimonious budget debates of the 1990s, which often 
ended in protracted impasses and delayed budget 
resolutions, there have been no further disputes 
between parliament and the executive since the early 
2000s. In the Duma today, half as much time is spent 
discussing budget laws as in the early 2000s. The 
number of changes made during the readings in the 
Duma have declined continuously as well.97 As a 
result, budget planning has become very predictable. 
The price being paid for this seemingly orderly pro-
cess, however, is the large-scale erosion of parliamen-
tary control. The fact that the executive branch in 
Russia today does not need to worry about support 
from Duma representatives is due above all to the 
successful establishment of a “party of power”, the 
United Russia party. Since 2016, the party has even 
had a large enough majority in the State Duma to 
change the constitution (343 of 450 seats). United 
Russia representatives use their Duma mandate to 
pursue particularistic interests,98 but parliamentary 
budget debates always end with their parliamentary 
group voting to adopt budget laws in virtually un-
changed form. Most representatives of the opposition 
groups faithful to the system use the opportunity to 
distinguish themselves politically from other parties 
 
97 Ben Noble, “Amending Budget Bills in the Russian State 
Duma”, Post-Communist Economies 29, no. 4 (2017): 505–22. 
98 Thomas Remington, “Patronage and the Party of Power. 
President-Parliament Relations under Vladimir Putin”, 
Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 6 (2008): 959–87. 
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(although without consequences) by abstaining or 
voting against the budget proposals.99 
Drafting budget proposals is the task of the govern-
ment. At the government level, a “social bloc” and 
a “security bloc” can be distinguished. Vice Prime 
Minister Olga Golodets and the political representa-
tives of the health, education, and labor ministry are 
commonly counted as part of the “social bloc”. The 
“security bloc” is generally considered to consist of 
Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin (since May 2018: 
Yuri Borisov), Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and the 
representatives of the security agencies and national 
guard (Viktor Zolotov), the secret service, and the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs. The main opponent of both 
blocs in the government is the Ministry of Finance, 
which always takes a very restrictive position towards 
any spending. It is often counted as part of the “finan-
cial-economic bloc” together with the Ministry of 
Economic Development.100 
The Kremlin sets clear boundaries on government 
negotiations. The president determines the scope of 
discussions by issuing directives with long-term im-
pacts such as the May Decrees of 2012 or the mora-
torium on tax increases up to 2018.101 If the president 
decides to pursue a concrete goal, he has the formal 
and informal means at his disposal to push it through 
at the governmental level.102 Vladimir Putin likes to 
use television appearances to announce popular gov-
ernment measures, which are then implemented 
without controversy or public opposition.103 Politically 
 
99 Aside from United Russia, only the nationalist “liberal-
democratic party” voted in favor of the current budget law 
for 2018–2020, Vadim Visloguzov, “Bjudzhet povyshennoj 
prochnosti” [Budget of increased stability], Kommersant, 
28 October 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3453712 
(accessed 5 January 2018). 
100 Stephen Fortescue, “Russian Federal Budget Formation. 
Introduction”, Post-Communist Economies 29, no. 4 (2017): 453. 
The Russian elite is also often differentiated into the “Silo-
viki” (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Secret Service, and Mili-
tary) and the “liberals”. This differentiation focuses on the 
distinguishing ideological orientation and typical career 
paths of each group, while the term “bloc” is used to refer 
to the official roles of the various government agencies. 
101 Titov, “Putin prizval vvesti moratorij na izmenenie 
nalogovoj nagruzki” (see note 31). 
102 Stephen Fortescue, “The Role of the Executive in Rus-
sian Budget Formation”, Post-Communist Economies 29, no. 4 
(2017): 523–37. 
103 The most recent example was the cancellation of tax 
debts, new social benefits for mothers on the birth of their 
first child, and measures to reduce gas prices. 
risky decisions are not made without Putin’s explicit 
agreement.104 
Since the beginning of the economic crisis, the 
President has tightened the reins further. Putin has 
been meeting with the government ministers on a 
biweekly basis since 2014 – sometimes even in the 
absence of the Prime Minister. In summer of 2016, 
when the budget situation was especially critical, 
the group of individuals actively involved in budget 
planning shrunk further, when the Kremlin and the 
Ministry of Finance delayed negotiations with the 
other ministries for several months. When the govern-
ment commissions for the various ministries ultimate-
ly started working, they had to follow new, restrictive 
rules on the confidentiality of budget proposals. Just a 
month was planned for consultations within the 
government and for the discussion in parliament.105 
Highlights and lowlights of transparency 
In addition to a functioning separation of powers, 
transparency of planned expenditures is generally 
seen as a key precondition for public control of 
national budgets. At the same time, an increase in 
transparency without checks and balances may also 
be a sign of strengthening authoritarian control over 
the use of resources in various areas of the govern-
ment administrative apparatus and may thus enable 
the centralization of power. 
Russia has been scoring high for several years in 
international comparisons of public budget trans-
parency. In a ranking by the independent Institute 
of International Budget Partnership, Russia is on par 
with Germany.106 For its ranking, the organization 
evaluates what data is published by the government 
and whether the point in time of publication theo-
 
104 An example is the discussion on the use of pension 
contributions, see Thomas Remington, Pension Reform in 
Authoritarian Regimes: Russia and China Compared (Atlanta, 
July 2015), http://www.polisci.emory.edu/home/documents/ 
papers/pension-reform-%20authoritarian-regimes.pdf (ac-
cessed 9 October 2017). 
105 Aleksandra Prokopenko, “Novye pravila bjudzheta” 
[New budget rules], Vedomosti 19 October 2016, https://www. 
vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/10/19/661524-novie-
pravila (accessed 21 October 2017). 
106 International Budget Partnership, Open Budget Index 
2015, https://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/OBS2015-OBI-Rankings-English.pdf (accessed 2 Janu-
ary 2018). 
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retically enables societal budget control. It takes into 
account in its ranking reports from the Accounts 
Chamber of Russia, and the formal legal independ-
ence of this agency from the executive branch. 
The Russian Ministry of Finance publishes detailed 
plans and projections of revenues and expenditures 
as well as precise and reliable data on actual budget 
developments. The Accounts Chamber of Russia, like 
the German Federal Audit Office, provides extensive 
and critical comments on budget laws.107 The Russian 
Ministry of Finance occasionally seeks advice from 
international organizations to professionalize its ex-
penditure planning. In 2013, on invitation from the 
ministry, a team from the IMF conducted a compre-
hensive evaluation of transparency and risks of Rus-
 
107 On Russia’s individual ranking, see International 
Budget Partnership, Open Budget Survey 2015 – Russia, https:// 
www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBS2015-
CS-Russia-English.pdf (accessed 2 January 2018). 
sian government spending. The IMF report praises the 
Russian government for its progress in the transpar-
ency of revenue and expenditure policies over the 
previous few years; its critique focuses on the unclear 
role of state corporations.108 
The Russian case reveals the methodological limits 
of transparency rankings that are based on formal cri-
teria. The Russian Ministry of Finance does not have 
to respond to objections from the Accounts Chamber, 
and it is by no means obligated to make improve-
ments to budgets. Given the largely state-controlled 
media landscape, the reports published by the Ac-
counts Chamber cannot generate any political pres-
sure from the public at large. The transparency rank-
ing also does not take into account what portion of 
the budget is considered classified information for 
reasons of national security. 
 
108 IMF, Russian Federation: Fiscal Transparency Evaluation 
(see note 3). 
Figure 9 
Percentage of classified expenditures (federal budget) 
Source: Gaidar Institute, Russian Economy in 2016. Trends and Outlooks (Moscow, 2017). 
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The Russian Finance Ministry 
occasionally seeks advice from 
international organizations to 
professionalize expenditure planning. 
The percentage of confidential budget expendi-
tures has increased in Russia in recent years, in appar-
ent contradiction to the improvements in its transpar-
ency rankings. In 2016, 21.7 percent of federal expen-
ditures were classified.109 This is a spectacularly high 
percentage: In many of the G20 countries, less than 
1 percent of budget expenditures are classified.110 In 
Russia, not only arms purchases in the defense budget 
are classified, but expenditures in the categories of 
“federal questions” (especially in the subcategory “in-
ternational relations and international cooperation”) 
and “economy” (especially in the subcategory “other 
questions of the national economy”) are listed as clas-
sified to an increasing degree.111 
Other less conspicuous tendencies exacerbate the 
lack of transparency in the budget while simulta-
neously creating additional flexibility for the Kremlin. 
There was an increase in the percentage of unspecific 
subcategories in budget plans such as “other expendi-
tures” that can be allocated to specific uses later. The 
funds in contingency or shadow budgets such as the 
“presidential reserve”, introduced in 2014, or accu-
mulated in the state holding Rosneftegaz are grow-
ing.112 In budget years 2018–2020, over one billion 
rubles (over €15 billion) are allocated to general items 
like these that can be used by the executive branch at 
its own whims and without a supplementary budget. 
The percentage of these kinds of items was half that 
in the previous year’s budget.113 
 
109 Confidentiality can be used to avoid critical discussions 
among political actors about expenditures. For Russian civil 
servants, there are also strong personal incentives to expand 
confidentiality: Employees of Russian agencies that work 
with confidential information receive salary increases of as 
much as 75 percent; see Julian Cooper, “The Russian Budget-
ary Process and Defence. Finding the ‘Golden Mean’”, Post-
Communist Economies 29, no. 4 (2017): 483. 
110 IMF, Russian Federation: Fiscal Transparency Evaluation 
(see note 3), 33. 
111 Gaidar Institute, Russian Economy in 2016. Trends and Out-
looks (see note 78), 469. 
112 See the following section on Rosneftegaz. 
113 Ivan Tkachëv, “Oboronnyj trillion: v bjudzhete sozda-
dut rezerv na ‘otdel’nye meroprijatija’” [Defense trillion: 
A reserve for “special measures” introduced into the budget], 
Bypassing the budget: 
Public funds in state-owned companies 
State-owned enterprises in Russia serve as an impor-
tant source of budget revenues from tax payments, 
dividends, and proceeds from privatization. In 2016 
the government’s partial sale of its own shares in the 
oil companies Bashneft and Rosneft significantly 
reduced the looming budget deficit. At the same time, 
state-owned enterprises are being used directly by 
the Russian leadership to achieve their political aims. 
This dual role has impeded reforms of the sector and 
has created a breeding ground for conflicts within the 
Russian elite. 
The Russian government controls numerous com-
panies. Their annual expenditures make up an esti-
mated 29–30 percent of Russian GDP.114 Most of 
these are what are known as unitary enterprises, which 
are controlled directly by the federal, regional, and 
local government administrations. Well known exam-
ples include the Russian Post, Mosfilm film studio, 
and the Moscow Metro. A second group of govern-
ment-owned enterprises are joint stock companies, which 
are partially privately owned and listed on foreign 
stock exchanges. These include the two largest Rus-
sian state firms in the energy sector, Gazprom and 
Rosneft, Russia’s pipeline monopoly Transneft, the 
state-owned Sberbank and VTB Bank, and service 
providers like the airline Aeroflot or Rostelecom. A 
third, very particular type of state-owned enterprise 
can be best compared to foundations: state corpora-
tions, which include the defense and industrial hold-
ing conglomerate Rostec and the development bank 
Vnescheconombank (VEB), are effectively owned by 
themselves. 
Whereas unitary enterprises have limited power to 
make decisions without the agreement of the respect-
tive government level, joint stock companies and 
state corporations have much greater formal inde-
pendence. The Russian President appoints and dis-
misses the managing directors of state corporations, 
and thus holds the strongest influence over them.115 
Thanks to Vladimir Putin’s personal relationships to 
 
RBC, 18 September 2017, https://www.rbc.ru/economics/18/09/ 
2017/59bff3cf9a794710a9300d17 (accessed 2 February 2018). 
114 IMF, Russian Federation: Fiscal Transparency Evaluation 
(see note 3). 
115 Viktor Kessler, Die sichtbare Hand des Staates. Eine rechts-
ökonomische Analyse russischer Staatskorporationen, Schriften-
reihe zum Osteuropäischen Recht 19 (Berlin, 2013), 326. 
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the corporate executives, the Kremlin has the possi-
bility to exercise relative direct control and influence, 
independent of company structure. Putin has a shared 
history at KGB in Dresden with Sergey Chemezov and 
Nikolay Tokarev, chief executives of the state corpo-
ration Rostec and oil pipeline company Transneft. 
The CEO of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, has been working 
at Putin’s side since the early 1990s. 
The transparency of state-owned enterprises is 
determined by their legal form and whether they are 
listed on international capital markets. Open joint 
stock companies listed on foreign markets are subject 
to the strictest regulation and outside auditing. State 
corporations, in contrast, are not subject to regular 
outside audits of their activities.116 Since they are not 
legally under state ownership, their revenues do not 
 
116 In some cases, there are stricter laws applying to state 
corporations depending on the acts of incorporation and 
form of financing, see ibid. 
flow into the budget.117 Unitary enterprises and joint 
stock companies are less privileged: part of their prof-
its have to be paid into the budget (in particular, 
stock companies’ dividends). They also provide budget 
financing when they are either fully (relatively rare) 
or partially (more frequent) privatized. 
Dividends: Insubordinate 
energy companies 
The leadership of state-owned joint stock companies 
prefer to keep their profits and reinvest according to 
their own priorities. The average amount of dividends 
paid by state joint stock companies to the budget is 
low by international comparison.118 The Finance Min-
 
117 Carsten Sprenger, “State Ownership in the Russian 
Economy. Its Magnitude, Structure and Governance Prob-
lems”, Journal of Institute of Public Enterprise 33, no. 1–2 (2010). 
118 Aleksandr Branis, “Otdajte dividendy!” [Pay out the 
dividends!], Vedomosti, 1 March 2017, https://www.vedomosti. 
Figure 10 
Russian budget revenues from state-owned enterprises, 2006–2016 (in billion rubles) 
Source: Gaidar Institute, Russian Economy in 2016. Trends and Outlooks (Moscow, 2017). 
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istry therefore receives significantly less as returns on 
equity from the shares in state joint stock companies 
than what it has to spend on its own financing through 
sovereign bonds. This means an implicit “dividend sub-
sidy” to state companies – independent of tax ben-
efits and other forms of subsidies – in the amount of 
386 billion rubles in 2015 and 346 billion rubles in 
2016 (€5.9 and €5.2 billion, respectively). 
The Finance Ministry has been working for several 
years to impose the same rules for dividends on all 
state-owned joint stock companies. This has been un-
successful to date, however, due to exemptions that 
some companies have secured with support from the 
Kremlin. 
To increase budget revenues after the drop in the 
oil price, Prime Minister Medvedev issued a directive 
 
ru/opinion/articles/2017/03/02/679573-otdaite-dividendi (ac-
cessed 2 February 2018). 
in April 2016 attempting to force higher dividend 
payouts. According to this directive, in 2017, state-
owned joint stock companies were to pay out 50 per-
cent of the previous year’s net profits according to 
theInternational Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
The increase in revenues was already planned into 
the budget law for 2017–2019. As early as Spring of 
2017, however, the Russian Accounts Chamber had 
doubts as to whether the government would be able 
to overcome opposition from the corporations and 
push this through.119 
Most of the smaller joint stock companies com-
plied and distributed more of their profits than in 
 
119 Schetnaya Palata, Zakljuchenie Schetnoj palaty Rossijskoj 
Federacii na proekt federal’nogo zakona № 185935-7 [Conclusions 
of the Russian Accounts Chamber on draft federal law 
no. 185935-7] (Moscow, 2017), http://audit.gov.ru/activities/ 
audit-of-the-federal-budget/30381/ (accessed 8 August 2017). 
Figure 11 
Nested shareholdings in state-owned energy companies as of May 2018 
Source: Diagram by author based on Margarita Papchenkova, Elizaveta Bazanova, and Ol’ga Petrova, “Minfin prodolzhaet  
bor’bu za dividendy goskompanij” [Finance ministry continues battle over dividends from state-owned companies], Vedomosti, 
10 July 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2017/07/10/717277-minfin-dividendi (accessed 3 January 2018). 
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the previous years. In the energy sector, however, 
further exceptions were made with support from the 
Kremlin. Despite the 50 percent directive, the amount 
of Gazprom dividends was just 20 percent of their 
profits from 2016 according to the IFRS, which they 
justified by major investment projects (especially the 
construction of gas pipelines). Rosneft distributed 35 
percent of its net profits. The official explanation for 
this was that since the company is only indirectly 
owned by the state, via Rosneftegaz (see figure 11), 
Rosneft is not, strictly speaking, state-owned and 
Medvedev’s directive therefore does not apply to it. 
The pipeline company Transneft distributed just 13 
percent of its IFRS profits in 2017, and justified this 
by arguing that a higher payout contradicted Russian 
accounting principles, because the profits were 
recorded almost entirely by the subsidiary companies 
and not by Transneft itself.120 
A clear pattern emerges in the distribution of 
dividends: In the past, the three companies Gazprom, 
Rosneft, and Transneft fulfilled numerous political 
functions for the Kremlin, among other things in the 
construction of oil and gas pipelines and manage-
ment of energy exports, in the nationalization of the 
media landscape (especially by Gazprom Media), or in 
providing financial support for public infrastructure 
projects or foreign allies.121 In the case of these com-
panies, the Russian leadership is less interested in 
having profits flow into the federal budget, since it 
can directly and informally influence how they are 
used in the companies themselves. This also means 
that the directors of these companies are themselves 
powerful figures who have no interest in reforming 
the public sector. 
Rosneftegaz as a shadow budget 
The case of the state energy holding Rosneftegaz 
clearly shows how public funds are used politically in 
bypassing the budget. The Rosneft dividends and part 
 
120 Margarita Papchenkova , Elizaveta Bazanova and Ol’ga 
Petrova, “Minfin prodolzhaet bor’bu za dividendy goskom-
panij” [Finance ministry continues battle over dividends in 
state-owned companies], Vedomosti, 10 July 2017, https:// 
www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2017/07/10/717277-
minfin-dividendi (accessed 3 January 2018). 
121 On Rosneft, see Hans-Henning Schröder, “Der Mineral-
ölkonzern ‘Rosneft’. Kommerzieller Erfolg und Einsatz poli-
tischer Machtmittel” [The mineral oil corporation Rosneft. 
Commercial success and the use of instruments of political 
power], Russland-Analysen, no. 348 (2018): 9–16. 
of the Gazprom dividends do not go directly into the 
Russian budget but are distributed to Rosneftegaz, 
which stands between the state and the energy com-
panies. The holding company is the formal owner 
of all government Rosneft shares and is 100 percent 
state-owned. It originally served as a vehicle for a 
merger that was planned in 2004 between Rosneft, 
which was much smaller at the time, and Gazprom, 
but that was not carried out.122 Today, the holding is 
controlled by the CEO of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, who 
is Rosneftegaz’s board chairman. The management 
of Rosneftegaz also comes from Rosneft.123 
Sechin had initially left his post at the head of 
Rosneft in 2011 under pressure from then President 
Medvedev. With Putin’s return to the Kremlin, Sechin 
took over leadership of the company again. Since 
Sechin’s return, Rosneftegaz has changed its dividend 
payout policy and only passes on part of the divi-
dends it receives from Rosneft, Gazprom, and other 
shareholdings to the federal budget, leaving the ma-
jority of these profits in the accounts of Rosneftegaz. 
Raiffeisenbank estimated the amount of dividends 
collected by Gazprom and Rosneft at the end of 2016 
at 544 billion rubles (€8.2 billion). The actual amount 
is not public information because Rosneftegaz’s legal 
status changed in 2016 from an open joint stock com-
pany (Otkrytoye aktsionernoye obshchestvo) to a closed 
joint stock company (Aktsionernoye obshchestvo). 
The last public annual report is from 2014.124 Even 
the Russian Ministry of Economics was unsuccessful 
in its recent efforts to obtain information on Ros-
neftegaz’s finances.125 In response to an inquiry to 
this effect from Rosimushchestvo, the Russian Federal 
Agency for State Property Management, the director 
 
122 “Chronika slijanija“ [Timeline of the merger], Kommer-
sant, 3 March 2005, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/551982 
(accessed 2 February 2018). 
123 Dmitrij Kozlov, “Rukovodstvo ‘Rosneftegazom’ doverili 
ėks-ministru” [Former minister entrusted with leadership 
of Rosneftegaz], Kommersant, 3 June 2016, https://www. 
kommersant.ru/doc/3005490 (accessed 5 February 2019). 
124 “‘Rosneftegaz’ poluchil pravo skryvat’ o sebe infor-
maciju” [Rosneftegaz gains right to keep company infor-
mation confidential], Interfax, 18 March 2016, http://www. 
interfax.ru/business/499118 (accessed 5 January 2018). 
125 Margarita Papchenkova and Galina Starinskaya, 
“Finansy ‘Rosneftegaza’ zakryty poka i dlja pravitel’stva” 
[Rosneftegaz finances remain classified for the government], 
Vedomosti, 27 June 2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/ 
economics/articles/2017/06/26/697334-finansi-rosneftegaza 
(accessed 2 January 2018).  
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of Rosneftegaz stated that he only sends his reports 
directly to the Russian President.126 
President Vladimir Putin has expressly supported 
Sechin’s efforts to withhold profits retained by Ros-
neftegaz from the Russian budget and to use them to 
create a shadow budget outside of public control and 
beyond the reach of budget laws. In response to ques-
tions about the the dividends accumulated by Ros-
neftegaz, he remarked: “We will use Rosneftegaz 
funds for things that there is no money left for after 
all the bickering and wrangling, but that need fund-
ing.”127 According to Putin, Rosneftegaz gives priority 
financing to research projects and the construction of 
aircraft and engines. The state holding also finances 
the Rosneft shipbuilding complex Zvezda near Vladi-
vostok and the construction of four power plants in 
Kaliningrad.128 
Privatization 
Through Igor Sechin, the Russian President has access 
to funds from Rosneftegaz to address economic and 
social problems that the Kremlin considers urgent. 
The government’s informal control over these busi-
nesses also bears risks, however, because it gives 
those at the helm of the companies (such as Igor 
Sechin) personal political clout. Not just the dividend 
policy but also privatizations bear substantial poten-
tial for conflict: the lucrative and influential position 
of the corporate managers close to the Kremlin is 
under threat when state-owned enterprises pass over 
into private ownership. 
This partially explains why budget revenues from 
privatization in Russia have been significantly lower 
than revenues from dividends over the last few years. 
The year 2016 was an exception because of two par-
ticularly large privatization projects. Without the 
sales of shares in the oil companies Bashneft (330 bil-
 
126 Margarita Papchenkova and Galina Starinskaya, “Polu-
chit’ dochody ot ‘Rosneftegaza’ v bjudzhet, vozmozhno, 
ne poluchitsja” [May not be possible to obtain Rosneftegaz 
profits for the budget], Vedomosti, 25 October 2016, https:// 
www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/10/25/662262-
dohodi-rosneftegaza (accessed 2 January 2018). 
127 “Putin pojasnil, na kakie proekty pojdut den’gi ‘Ros-
neftegaza’” [Putin explained which projects the Rosneftegaz 
money are going to], RIA Novosti, 23 December 2016, https:// 
ria.ru/economy/20161223/1484467582.html (accessed 17 
August 2017). 
128 Papchenkova, Bazanova, and Petrova, “Minfin prodol-
zhaet bor’bu za dividendy goskompanij” (see note 120). 
lion rubles, €5 billion) and Rosneft (692 billion rubles, 
€10.5 billion), the federal budget deficit would not 
have been 3.4 percent but 4.6 percent of GDP. 
The sales of shares in Rosneft was part of a privati-
zation program adopted in 2013, which was scarcely 
implemented otherwise. It was planned that smaller 
stakes would be sold not only in Rosneft but also in 
the state corporations Alrosa (diamond mining), Aero-
flot (airline), Sovcomflot (shipbuilding), Transneft, 
Rushydro (hydropower), the national railway, and the 
state bank VTB.129 Almost no additional revenues 
from privatization are part of the budget plans up to 
2020.130 
The Bashneft shares were renationalized in 2014. 
Previous to that, the mineral oil company had been 
majority-owned by the private holding Sistema, headed 
by Russian businessman Vladimir Yevtushenkov. The 
sale of shares to Rosneft that followed this in 2016 
cannot be considered as privatization in the strict 
sense, because the shares in Bashneft went from the 
state agency Rosimushchestvo to state-owned Rosneft. 
Bashneft is thus still state-controlled but is now part 
of the company headed by Igor Sechin. 
The sale of Bashneft to Rosneft was preceded by 
disputes over whether such pseudo-privatizations 
make sense. Former Minister of Economic Develop-
ment Alexey Ulyukaev and the former head of Ros-
neft Board of Directors, Andrey Belousov,131 expressed 
criticism. They argued that the sales of one state-
owned enterprise to another does not create addition-
al budget revenues in the long term. Igor Sechin ulti-
mately kept the upper hand, however, and was able 
to integrate Bashneft into Rosneft. The formal justifi-
cation for the transaction was – as in the preceding 
discussion around dividend policy – that Rosneft was 
not a state-owned corporation in the narrow sense, as 
it was controlled by Rosneftegaz. 
 
129 Part of the Alrosa shares were sold in 2016, Tat’jana 
Radchenko, Gosudarstvennoe uchastie v rossijskoj ėkonomike: gos-
kompanii, zakupki, privatizacija [Government involvement in 
the Russian economy: state enterprises, procurement, pri-
vatization], Bjulleten’ o razvitii konkurencii 13 (Moscow, 
2016), http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/8449.pdf (accessed 
3 August 2017). 
130 Minfin Rossii, Osnovnye napravlenija bjudzhetnoj, nalogovoj 
i tamozhenno-tarifnoj politiki na 2018 god i planovyj period 2019 i 
2020 godov [Fundamental directions of the budget, tax and 
customs tariff policy for the year 2018 and the planning 
periods 2019 and 2020] (Moscow, 2017). 
131 His successor in this position is former German Chan-
cellor Gerhard Schröder. 
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The reprivatization of Bashneft had politically 
significant legal consequences in the arrest and sub-
sequent conviction of Minister of Economic Develop-
ment Ulyukayev. The legal proceedings against Ulyu-
kayev were the result of a covert operation initiated 
by Sechin and carried out by the Federal Security 
Service (FSB). At a meeting with Sechin, Ulyukayev 
had accepted a closed suitcase containing $2 million 
in cash. According to Sechin, the Minister had solici-
ted the money in exchange for agreeing to the sale 
of Bashneft to Rosneft, which Ulyukayev denied. In 
December 2017, Ulyukayev was sentenced to eight 
years in prison and a fine of $2 million. The court 
proceedings failed to produce clear proof of Ulyu-
kayev’s guilt.132 
It was the first time in the history of post-Soviet 
Russia that a Federal Minister was jailed. Reform-
oriented politicians like Alexei Kudrin must have 
understood Ulyukayev’s sentence as a signal to those 
“systemic liberals” still in the government not to 
interfere in the business of state-owned enterprises. 
Kudrin, who called the Ulyukayev sentence “terrible 
and unjustified”, had proposed a far-reaching pri-
vatization of state-owned enterprises himself in 
summer of 2017.133 Whether the political leadership 
actually wanted to send that kind of signal is unclear. 
The case does make it clear, however, what risks the 
personalized control of public resources entails for 
the internal stability of the political system and its 
capacity to undergo reforms. 
 
132 Roland Götz, “Ulyukayev Fall und Jewtuschenkows 
Niederlage. Rosnefts Expansion durch Annexion” [Ulyu-
kayev’s fall and Yevtushenkov’s defeat. Rosneft’s expansion 
by annexation], Russland-Analysen, no. 348 (2018): 2–4, http:// 
www.laender-analysen.de/russland/pdf/RusslandAnalysen 
348.pdf (accessed 5 February 2018). 
133 “Kudrin prizval k privatizacii vsech neftjanych akti-
vov” [Kudrin called for privatization of all oil companies], 
Interfax, 1 June 2017, http://www.interfax.ru/forumspb/ 
564758 (accessed 5 February 2018). 
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A decade of economic stagnation and the oil price 
slump have largely exhausted the Russian Finance 
Ministry’s reserves. With recovering energy prices, 
they are now only being replenished slowly. However, 
Russia’s public debt remains low. As a result, even 
though the Russian leadership did not carry out struc-
tural reforms after the economic crisis, the financial 
stability of Russia’s government budget is not in 
immediate danger. 
The Kremlin’s fiscally conservative stance may at 
first seem to promote stability. In recent years, the 
political leadership has succeeded in maintaining the 
status quo by further centralizing formal authority 
over political and economic decisions and by institut-
ing informal controls, particularly in the case of the 
major state-owned enterprises. This form of crisis 
management promotes some processes, however, that 
could prove to be problematic in the long term, both 
for domestic policy as well as for Russia’s relationship 
to Germany and the EU. 
Moscow’s handling of the fiscal pressures in 2015 
and 2016 shows that Russian authoritarianism is 
becoming even less transparent and simultaneously 
more centralized. The concentration of economic and 
political power in the hands of Vladimir Putin and 
his immediate circle will exacerbate the risks to sta-
bility for the regime in the years to come, since ac-
cording to the constitution, the Russian president is 
not allowed to stand for election in 2024. If there is 
indeed going to be a change of guard in the Kremlin 
in 2024, according to the common practice in Russia, 
the successor will already take office as acting Presi-
dent even earlier, before the presidential election 
takes place. The political poker for Putin’s succession 
could begin early, and a series of measures undertak-
en since 2016, such as the reappointment of officials 
to important positions within the Kremlin adminis-
tration can already be understood as part of this pro-
cess. The stakes are high, and the struggles around 
who will fill these positions can be expected to lead 
to new conflicts within the Russian elite. 
Against this backdrop, there can be little hope that 
the Kremlin will push forward with politically diffi-
cult economic reforms that could ultimately lead to 
diversification and sustainable development of the 
Russian economy. In view of the demographic bur-
dens and the uncertainty regarding new US sanctions, 
ongoing economic stagnation is more likely, which 
could increasingly undermine the legitimacy of the 
regime. The Kremlin recently dealt with this problem 
by increasing repression and intensifying its control 
over the media and social networks. 
When faced with economic difficulties in the past, 
the Russian leadership has also used anti-Western 
propaganda as an alternative strategy of legitimiza-
tion. If dissatisfaction within the Russian population 
increases, heightened foreign policy confrontation 
with the USA and EU could benefit the Kremlin. 
The tightening in Russia’s financial situation could 
also have negative impacts on the region’s stability: 
If Russia discontinues its substantial subsidies to 
several neighboring countries (particularly Belarus), 
these countries could find it less appealing to main-
tain political and economic ties with Russia. At the 
same time, the Russian leadership is unlikely to 
relinquish its hegemonial claims. To compensate for 
its declining economic appeal, Russia could turn to 
other instruments of political power. One possibility 
would be the military;134 others could include tough 
economic measures and trade sanctions or increased 
pressure on guest workers. 
In the area of economic policy, just as in foreign 
policy, the Russian leadership has focused recent 
efforts on isolating itself to an increasing degree from 
 
134 See Margarete Klein, Russlands Militärpolitik im post-
sowjetischen Raum [Russia’s military policy in the post-Soviet 
space], SWP-Studie 19/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, September 2018). 
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the EU. The Kremlin took Western sanctions as an 
occasion to introduce a wide-ranging program of 
import substitution, including an import embargo 
that also affected German exports to Russia. The pro-
tectionism applies primarily to trade, however, and 
less to investments: The Russian government recently 
intensified its efforts to induce foreign manufacturers 
to move production to Russia. In its “special invest-
ment contracts” (“SpetsInvestKontrakt”) it promises 
privileges and stable long-term conditions. 
Germany and the EU have few options at their 
disposal to influence Russian domestic and economic 
policy developments in the near term. This is due, on 
the one hand, to the current tense relationship with 
Russia and mutual economic sanctions, and on the 
other, to the Russian regime’s course of action over 
the last decade, which has been to systematically cut 
itself off from Western influences. 
For this reason, above all, Germany and the EU 
should follow their own long-term strategic perspec-
tive. Diversification of the Russian economy, for in-
stance, is not just in the economic but also in the 
security policy interest of the EU. With a diversified 
economy that is integrated into international supply 
chains, Russia is likely to develop a stronger national 
interest in the stability of international rules. The 
risks to the stability of the system would be lower in 
Russia if the government were less dependent on 
volatile oil and gas revenues. 
Through targeted support for economic coopera-
tion outside of trade in fossil energies, Germany and 
the EU could support diversification in Russia. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) could play a central role in this. The bank has 
already financed investments in Russia that contrib-
ute to diversification, with a focus on small and 
medium-sized enterprises. According to the bank’s 
own figures, 90 percent of its clients are from the 
private sector.135 For Russian entrepreneurs, coopera-
tion with the EBRD means more than just the possi-
bility of financing: the EBRD’s involvement is espe-
cially appealing to small and medium-sized private 
 
135 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), The EBRD in Russia: Overview, https://www.ebrd.com/cs/ 
Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395238401543&pagename=EBRD%
2FContent%2FContentLayout (accessed 27 March 2018). 
enterprises because it can protect them against intru-
sion or expropriation by state actors.136 
Due to Russia’s role in the crisis in Ukraine, the 
EBRD received instructions in July of 2014 not to fund 
any further investment projects in Russia. This deci-
sion is not part of the EU Council decisions on the 
Russian sectoral economic sanctions, which were tied 
to the implementation of the Minsk agreement.137 
The EBRD could thus resume its work again without 
the conditionality of the economic sanctions being 
undermined. Precisely because of the EBRD’s unique 
orientation, it would be beneficial to a strategic for-
eign policy towards Russia for the EBRD to begin 
funding projects in Russia again. 
Furthermore, the significant interest on the part 
of the Russian leadership in attracting foreign manu-
facturers to Russia provides an opportunity to expand 
economic cooperation in the direction of long-term 
diversification. The large number of new investment 
projects in Russia shows that German companies are 
clearly interested in Russian investment agreements, 
despite the difficulties that import substitution 
creates. Although foreign investors in Russia cannot 
be expected to have an immediate transformative 
impact in the sense of “change through rapproche-
ment”, the investments could at least help to create 
conditions that would allow Russia to begin moving 
toward a less oil-dependent future. 
 
 
136 Stanislav Markus, “Secure Property as a Bottom-Up 
Process. Firms, Stakeholders, and Predators in Weak States”, 
World Politics 64, no. 2 (2012): 242–77. 
137 European Commission, European Union Restrictive Meas-
ures (Sanctions) in Force, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/ 
files/restrictive_measures-2017-08-04.pdf (accessed 27 March 
2018). 
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Appendix A: Federal budget 2006 to 2020 (in percent of GDP) as of May 2018 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018* 2019* 2020* 
Revenues  23.3  23.4  22.5  18.9  17.9  18.9  18.9  17.8  18.3  16.4  15.6  16.4  15.7  15.1  14.8 
Gas & oil  10.9  8.7  10.6  7.7  8.3  9.4  9.5  8.9  9.4  7.0  5.6  6.5  5.6  5.1  4.9 
Other  12.4  14.7  11.8  11.2  9.7  9.5  9.4  8.9  8.9  9.4  10.0  9.9  10.0  10.0  9.8 
Expenditures  15.9  18.0  18.3  24.9  21.8  18.1  18.9  18.2  18.7  18.8  19.1  17.8  17.0  15.9  15.6 
Federal questions  2.0  2.5  2.0  2.2  1.9  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.1 
Defense  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.1  2.8  2.5  2.7  2.9  3.1  3.8  4.4  3.1  2.8  2.7  2.5 
National security  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.6  2.3  2.1  2.7  2.8  2.6  2.4  2.2  2.1  2.2  2.1  1.9 
Economy  1.3  2.1  2.5  4.3  2.6  3.0  2.9  2.5  3.9  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.5  2.3  2.2 
Education  0.8  0.9  0.9  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6 
Health  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7 
Sozial policy  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.7  5.2  5.7  5.2  4.4  5.1  5.3  5.4  4.8  4.6  4.4 
Transfers**  5.6  5.7  6.5  9.3  8.9  1.1  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7 
Other  0.5  1.1  0.5  0.6  0.8  1.2  1.0  1.1  1.0  1.3  1.1  1.1  1.3  1.0  1.5 
Surplus / Deficit  7.4  5.4  4.1 –6.0  –3.9  0.7  –0.1  –0.4  0.8  –2.4  –3.4  –1.4  –1.3  –0.8 –0.8 
Note: Data on years marked with an * are based on Russian budget planning for the period 2018–2020. 
**Includes federal transfers to regional budgets. Up to 2010, pension fund transfers were also included. 
At the end of May 2018, a new budget bill was introduced in the Russian Duma taking the sharply increased oil price from 2018 into account.  
As a result of this, revenues are 1.8 percent of GDP higher, and instead of a deficit of 1.3 percent of GDP, a surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP is expected,  
Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal’nogo Sobranija Rossijskoj Federacii, Zakonoproekt No. 476242-7 [draft law no. 476242-7], 29 May 2018,  
http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/476242-7. 
Source: Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkonomicheskie pokazateli Rossijskoj Federacii (see note 1); Rosstat, Valovoj vnutrennij produkt (see note 1). 
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Appendix B 
Consolidated budget 2006 to 2020 (in percent of GDP) as of May 2018 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018* 2019* 2020* 
Revenues  39.5  40.2  39.2  35.0  34.6  34.6  34.4  33.4  33.8  32.3  32.8  33.7  32.0  31.7  30.5 
Gas & oil  10.9  8.7  10.6  7.7  8.3  9.4  9.5  8.9  9.4  7.0  5.6  6.5  5.6  5.1  4.9 
Other  28.5  31.5  28.5  27.4  26.3  25.2  24.9  24.5  24.4  25.3  27.1  27.2  26.4  26.4  25.6 
Expenditures  31.1  34.2  34.3  41.4  38.0  33.2  34.0  34.6  34.9  35.7  36.4  35.2  33.9  32.8  31.4 
Federal questions  3.1  3.5  3.1  3.4  3.1  2.3  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.0  1.9  2.0 
Defense  2.5  2.5  2.5  3.1  2.8  2.5  2.7  2.9  3.1  3.8  4.4  3.1  2.8  2.7  2.6 
National security  2.7  2.6  2.6  3.2  2.9  2.5  2.8  3.0  2.8  2.5  2.3  2.2  2.2  2.1  1.9 
Economy  3.5  4.7  5.5  7.2  5.0  4.6  4.8  4.5  5.7  4.5  4.5  4.7  4.0  3.7  3.6 
Education  3.9  4.0  4.0  4.6  4.1  3.7  3.8  3.9  3.8  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.4  3.3 
Health  3.6  4.2  3.7  4.3  3.7  3.2  3.3  3.2  3.2  3.4  3.6  3.1  4.0  3.8  3.7 
Social policy  8.8  8.6  9.1  12.2  13.3  10.8  11.3  12.0  11.1  12.6  12.7  13.1  12.3  12.0  11.0 
Other  3.0  4.1  3.8  3.4  3.1  3.6  3.2  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.4  3.1  3.2  3.3 
Surplus / Deficit  8.4  6.0  4.9  –6.3  –3.4  1.4  0.4  –1.2  –1.1  –3.4 – 3.7  –1.5  –1.9  –1.1  –0.9 
Non-Oil Deficit  –2.6  –2.7  –5.8 –14.0 –11.7  –7.9  –9.1 –10.1 –10.5 –10.4  –9.3  –8.0  –7.5 – 6.2  –5.9 
Note: The consolidated budget combines the federal budget, the regional and municipal budgets, and the social insurance, but net of all transfers  
between levels of government. Data on years marked with an * are based on Russian budget planning for the period 2018–2020. 
At the end of May 2018, a new budget bill was introduced in the Russian Duma taking the sharply increased oil price from 2018 into account.  
As a result of this, revenues are 1.8 percent of GDP higher, and instead of a deficit of 1.3 percent of GDP, a surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP is expected;  
Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal’nogo Sobranija Rossijskoj Federacii, Zakonoproekt No. 476242-7 [draft law no. 476242-7], 29 May 2018,  
http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/476242-7. 
Source: Minfin Rossii, Finansovo-ėkonomicheskie pokazateli Rossijskoj Federacii (see note 1); Rosstat, Valovoj vnutrennij produkt (see note 1). 
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